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The general paucity of authoritative mechanisms to interpret the four Geneva Conventions and the two Additional Protocols presents an obstacle to the development of international
humanitarian law (IHL), the body of law designed to regulate
the conduct of belligerents and to protect certain categories of
persons during warfare.1 This Article assesses the U.S. Supreme Court’s historical, current, and potential role in filling
this gap. How willing is the Court to engage humanitarian law
issues and how thorough is its treatment of them? What has
the Court contributed to the development of humanitarian law?
These questions demand primarily descriptive answers. As
courts and tribunals around the world grapple with thorny
questions of humanitarian law, the experience of the U.S. Supreme Court may be, at turns, instructive and cautionary. But
underneath these descriptive questions lies a partially normative one: what role should the Supreme Court play among other
law-declaring fora in interpreting and developing humanitarian
law?
The Supreme Court appears reluctant to invoke the Geneva Conventions. In fact, it has referenced Geneva law in only
ten cases: seven cases reference the Geneva Conventions of
1949 and the remaining three reference the Conventions of
1929 and 1864.2 In four of these ten cases, however, the con1. For a brief discussion of the sources of humanitarian law and relevant
interpretive bodies, see DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR 4 –17 (Adam Roberts & Richard Guelff eds., 3d ed. 2000).
2. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 817, 825 (2008) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 681 (2008); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548
U.S. 557, 567, 571–72, 589, 604, 612, 619–20, 625–33, 637, 642, 654, 694, 706,
715–20, 724 –25, 728–29 (2006), superseded by statute, Military Commissions
Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600; Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S.
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ventions receive only fleeting mention in contexts unrelated to
armed conflict.3 In another case, Geneva law surfaces only in
dissent.4 Throughout its history, therefore, the Court has made
explicit, substantive reference to Geneva law in only five cases.
The Geneva Conventions, of course, are not the end of the
story. Treaties stemming from the Hague Conferences of 1899
and 1907 as well as some customary rules also combine to form
the corpus of humanitarian law.5 The Court has referenced
Hague law in a total of sixteen cases, including three already
mentioned,6 placing the number of cases in which at least one
507, 515, 520–21, 538, 549–51, 587, 597 (2004) (plurality opinion); Stanford v.
Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 390 n.10 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting), abrogated
by Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S.
815, 831 n.34 (1988); Dep’t of Emp’t v. United States, 385 U.S. 355, 359 & n.8
(1966); Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 767, 785, 789 (1950); FTC v.
A.P.W. Paper Co., 328 U.S. 193, 196 n.1, 199, 200 n.5, 203 & n.10 (1946); In re
Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 6, 15–16, 20, 21 & n.8, 22–23, 24 & n.10 (1946); id. at
36–37 (Murphy, J., dissenting); id. at 57–58, 72 n.36, 73, 74 & n.38, 77–78, 81
(Rutledge, J., dissenting). This list does not include Justice Thomas’s recent
dissent from the Court’s denial of certiorari in Noriega v. Pastrana, 130 S. Ct.
1002 passim (2010), discussed in Part II.C.4, nor does it include Justice Breyer’s
passing reference to Geneva law in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S.
Ct. 2705, 2739 (2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting). “Geneva law” is herein used to
refer to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Convention of 1929 relating to armed conflict.
3. See Stanford, 492 U.S. at 389, 390 n.10 (citing Geneva Convention
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, as one of “three leading human rights treaties
ratified or signed by the United States [to] explicitly prohibit juvenile death
penalties”); Thompson, 487 U.S. at 831 n.34 (same); Dep’t of Emp’t, 385 U.S. at
359 & n.8 (recognizing that the American Red Cross was devised, in part, “to
meet this Nation’s commitments under various Geneva Conventions” and citing Geneva Conventions of 1864, 1929, and 1949); A.P.W. Paper Co., 328 U.S.
at 199, 200 & n.5 (describing the origins of the Red Cross organization and
quoting the 1929 Geneva Convention’s provision for the exclusive use of the
name and emblem of the Red Cross).
4. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 817, 825 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
5. See generally DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 1, at 47–
730 (compiling nearly 700 pages of treaties and other documents that comprise
the law of war).
6. Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 707 (2004) (Breyer, J.,
concurring); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 442 n.2
(1964); United States v. Merz, 376 U.S. 192, 199 n.4 (1964); Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 297 n.72 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring); Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 19 n.2 (1953); Harisiades v.
Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 586 n.7 (1952); Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341,
348 n.13 (1952); Ex parte Kawato, 317 U.S. 69, 72 n.1 (1942); Ex parte Quirin,
317 U.S. 1, 30 n.7, 34, 38 (1942); Littlejohn & Co. v. United States, 270 U.S.
215, 226 & n.* (1926); Oetjen v. Cent. Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 299, 301
(1918); Berg v. British & African Steam Navigation Co. v. United States, 243
U.S. 124, 150–51 (1917); MacLeod v. United States, 229 U.S. 416, 425–26
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member of the Court explicitly has considered the principal
humanitarian law treaties at only twenty-three. The Court’s
references to the customary laws of war, however, are more
numerous. Still, while it has referenced the “law of war” in over
one hundred cases, most such references are not to law of a distinctly “humanitarian” character.7 The Court’s long history of
reliance on the “law of war” thus reveals a similar paucity of
references to what can be more narrowly defined as the “humanitarian” law of war.
Yet this relatively small body of humanitarian law jurisprudence is wide-ranging. It encompasses a broad number of
substantive provisions of humanitarian law and arises in a variety of doctrinal contexts: the Court has invoked Hague and
Geneva law in interpreting the Eighth Amendment bar on
“cruel and unusual” punishment,8 as guidelines in fashioning
process requirements for military tribunals,9 and in adjudicating petitions for writs of habeas corpus.10
The jurisprudence reveals several distinct patterns in the
Court’s approach to humanitarian law issues. First, the Court
is loath to rest its decisions on humanitarian law treaties.11
The Court generally invokes humanitarian law as second-level
authority, which it scrupulously observes as being incorporated
into domestic law by statute or executive pronouncement.12
Second, even where the Court does not rest its decision on hu(1913). The foregoing does not duplicate cases that cite both Geneva and Hague
law, of which there are but three: Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 603, 604 & n.36 (plurality opinion); Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 520; and Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 8, 14, 15–
16; id. at 36–37 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
7. E.g., Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 762 (“[T]he Court addressed whether
habeas corpus jurisdiction extended to enemy aliens who . . . violat[ed] the
laws of war.”).
8. See Thompson, 487 U.S. at 831 n.34 (considering the implications of
the juvenile death penalty); see also Stanford, 492 U.S. at 390 n.10.
9. See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 631–33.
10. E.g., Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 705 (2008).
11. Humanitarian law treaties are not unique in this respect—at least for
certain portions of the Court’s history. See Paul B. Stephan, Treaties in the
Supreme Court: 1946–2000 (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 20), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1559151 (“What [the Court]
did not do [during this period] is allow treaties unaccompanied by statutory
implementation to serve as a basis for constraining the treaty-maker, namely
the federal government.”).
12. E.g., Hamdan 548 U.S. at 633 (“[I]t appears the Government ‘regard[s] the provisions of [Protocol I of the Geneva Convention of 1949] as an
articulation of safeguards to which all persons . . . are entitled.’” (quoting William H. Taft IV, Current Pressures on International Humanitarian Law: The
Law of Armed Conflict After 9/11, 28 YALE J. INT’L L. 319, 322 (2003))).
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manitarian law, it generally offers some degree of analysis, as
opposed to rejecting humanitarian law claims out of hand. This
analysis, however, suffers from a reticence explicitly to engage
the entire corpus of humanitarian law and a tendency to reference discrete principles without providing the necessary context. Third, the Court has historically referred to humanitarian
law for purposes of definition, either of particular concepts, or
to assess the charges levied against an individual challenging
his trial by military tribunal.13
This Article offers a comprehensive assessment of the Supreme Court’s approach to humanitarian law as embodied in
the Hague and Geneva Conventions.14 But first a cautionary
note is in order. This review is necessarily underinclusive in
that it does not consider cases in which humanitarian law issues were briefed but not addressed in the Court’s opinions. To
this extent, this Article does not offer a full picture of the
Court’s reluctance to engage humanitarian law arguments.
Still, focusing on what the Court has actually said about IHL is
a necessary step in understanding the Court’s place among
other law-declaring fora—national and international courts,
treaty bodies, etc.—in interpreting this crucial body of law. And
while the Court’s global influence may be waning, the United
States continues to play a major role in the development of customary international law.15 A close look at the Supreme Court’s
treatment of humanitarian law thus provides a useful window
onto its potential customary development.
13. E.g., In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 passim (1946) (analyzing how and
why the Geneva Convention did not apply).
14. For a broader discussion about the role of U.S. courts in interpreting
IHL, see Ralph G. Steinhardt, International Humanitarian Law in the Courts
of the United States: Yamashita, Filartiga, and 911, 36 GEO. WASH. INT’L L.
REV. 1 (2004). This Article does not wade into the heated debate about the merits of U.S. courts’ use of international and foreign law. For background, see
Judith Resnik, Law’s Migration: American Exceptionalism, Silent Dialogues,
and Federalism’s Multiple Ports of Entry, 115 YALE L.J. 1564 (2006); Ruth
Bader Ginsburg, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, “A Decent Respect to the
Opinions of [Human]kind”: The Value of a Comparative Perspective in Constitutional Adjudication (July 30, 2010), available at http://www.supremecourt
.gov/publicinfo/speeches/viewspeeches.aspx?filename=sp_07_30_10.html.
15. See Achilles Skordas, Hegemonic Custom?, in UNITED STATES
HEGEMONY AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 317, 319 (Michael
Byers & Georg Nolte eds., 2003) (noting the United States’ role in shaping customary international law); Adam Liptak, U.S. Court, a Longtime Beacon, Is
Now Guiding Fewer Nations, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2008, at A1, available at
2008 WLNR 17704106 (“[A] diminishing number of foreign courts seem to pay
attention to the writings of American justices.”).
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Part I of this Article assesses the Court’s historical recourse to the customary “laws of war,” situating the Court’s
first engagement with “humanitarian” law in the context of its
lengthy evolution. Part II assesses the Court’s treatment of law
arising from the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907. Part III
turns to the Court’s reliance on the Geneva Conventions of
1864, 1929, and 1949 and the Additional Protocols of 1977. The
Conclusion offers a macroscopic analysis of the Court’s approach and conclusions as to the Court’s role in developing humanitarian law. In short, the Court appears institutionally illsuited to the task of interpreting and developing IHL. Its analysis is sometimes haphazard, and never comprehensive. Yet the
Court has invoked this body of law from its earliest days, and
humanitarian law questions are sure to arise more frequently
as U.S. courts continue to grapple with legal issues stemming
from international terrorism. The Supreme Court’s preeminence in a state critical to shaping the international legal order
will ensure that it remains an important voice.
I. EARLY YEARS OF THE COURT AND THE “LAW OF
WAR”
The Supreme Court has invoked the law of war since shortly after its inception.16 Yet the term “law of war” is not a precise analog for the body of law studied in this Article. As a massive corpus of customary rules, treaties, and other documents,
the law of war has been evolving with civilization since its earliest days,17 and has come to include more than what might be
strictly termed “humanitarian” law.18 While this body of law is
no monolith, the Supreme Court tends to refer generally to the
“laws of war.” Moreover, commentators often use the terms
“law of war” and “humanitarian law” interchangeably.19 Therefore, several terminological distinctions will be useful before
evaluating the Court’s approach.
16. See infra note 23.
17. See, e.g., L.C. GREEN, THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT
15–53 (2000).
18. DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 1, at 2 (“A possible disadvantage of the term [‘humanitarian law’] is that it could be thought to exclude some parts of the laws of war (such as the law on neutrality) whose primary purpose is not humanitarian.”).
19. E.g., Gabor Rona, Interesting Times for International Humanitarian
Law: Challenges from the “War on Terror,” 27 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 55, 70
n.1 (2003) (“The terms ‘international humanitarian law,’ ‘humanitarian law,’
‘law of armed conflict,’ ‘jus in bello,’ and ‘law of war’ are all interchangeable.”).
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A. SITUATING HUMANITARIAN LAW IN THE LAW OF WAR
The law of war is comprised of two distinct spheres of law:
that governing resort to the use of force ( jus ad bellum) and
that governing conduct in war ( jus in bello).20 Commentators
often use the term “humanitarian law” to refer to the jus in bello. The humanitarian jus in bello is designed to ameliorate the
human suffering intrinsic to war, and has its principal modern
expression in the bodies of law developed in the Hague and Geneva.21 While these two bodies of law focus on distinct aspects
of humanitarian protections, the separate treatment of them in
this Article is a function of organizational utility, not substantive precision: commentators have long noted the artificiality of
drawing a sharp distinction between the two given their large
substantive overlap.22
The Court first referenced the “laws of war” in 179523 and
has continued to do so throughout its history in more than one
hundred cases, most recently in 2008.24 Only a small number of
these references, however, relate to what might be strictly
termed “humanitarian law.”
The Supreme Court’s first references to the “law of war”
adequately demonstrate the flexibility of the term. Of the capture by colonists of a British ship pursuant to an act of Congress,25 the Court stated “whether prize or no prize, is a part of
the power and law of war . . . and must be governed by the law
of nations.”26 The “law of war” here refers to the elaborate set of
customary rules governing the capture of property on the high
seas during warfare, or the law of maritime prize, that had

20. E.g., HILAIRE MCCOUBREY, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW:
MODERN DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LIMITATION OF WARFARE 1 (2d ed. 1998).
21. See, e.g., id. at 1–2.
22. Id. at 2.
23. Talbot v. Jansen, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 133, 148 (1795); see also Penhallow v.
Doane’s Adm’rs, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 54, 74 (1795) (referencing “law of war”).
24. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 762 (2008) (referring to an earlier
decision). Justice Thomas, in a dissent from the Court’s denial of certiorari in
Noriega v. Pastrana, referenced the executive’s stated policy to treat detainees
in accordance with “standards that draw on the ‘laws of war’ as those laws
have developed over time and have periodically been codified in treaties such
as the Geneva Conventions.” 130 S. Ct. 1002, 1008 (2010) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
25. Congress passed the act in retaliation for similar measures implemented by the British Parliament. Penhallow, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 53–57.
26. Id. at 74 (citation omitted).
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been developing since the early Middle Ages.27 Though the law
of maritime prize is a component of public international law relating to conduct in war,28 and hence conceptually part of the
jus in bello, as described below it cannot usefully be classified
as a component of humanitarian law. Indeed, the Court itself
has characterized the law of nations as being comprised of two
principal components in the early years of the Republic: that
governing behavior between states and another, “more pedestrian,” component concerned with regulating individuals outside domestic boundaries in matters touching mercantile relationships, shipwrecks, and commerce.29 This “pedestrian”
component must be disentangled from its humanitarian counterpart.
The “humanitarian” component of the jus in bello seeks explicitly to balance military necessity against human suffering.30
The Court has long recognized this fundamental tradeoff.
Speaking of the Revolutionary War, Justice Iredell remarked in
1796 that a
means of defence which, when inferior objects were in view, might not
be strictly justifiable, might, in such an extremity, become so, on the
great principle on which the laws of war are founded, selfpreservation; an object that may be attained by any means, not inconsistent with the eternal and immutable rules of moral obligation.31
27. See generally J.H.W. VERZIJL ET AL., 11 INTERNATIONAL LAW IN
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE: THE LAW OF MARITIME PRIZE (1992) (providing an
extensive history of the law of prize). Maritime prize law has been characterized as “the most obscure and extraneous doctrinal realm in public international law today.” David J. Bederman, The Feigned Demise of Prize Law, 9
EMORY INT’L L. REV. 31, 31 (1995) (book review). The Court’s early references
to the law of war in this connection, however, demonstrate the expansiveness
of the phrase, and the terminological complexities inherent in a historical
analysis of the Court’s approach to humanitarian law.
28. Bederman, supra note 27, at 33.
29. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 715 (2004).
30. J. Ricou Heaton, Civilians at War: Reexamining the Status of Civilians
Accompanying the Armed Services, 57 A.F. L. REV. 155, 182 (2005) (“The laws
of war have long acknowledged that injury to civilian objectives incidental to
attack on lawful military objectives may be legitimate if not excessive[,]
. . . . [which] calls for a balancing test to weigh military advantage against civilian harm.”).
31. Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 263–64 (1796). This reference appears in a discussion of whether customary law authorized the United States
to confiscate British debts during the Revolutionary War. While the statement
is plainly distinct from the Hague and Geneva branches of the jus in bello that
would crystallize over one hundred years later, it nonetheless demonstrates
the fundamental tradeoff inherent in humanitarian law: on the one hand, necessity or expediency during war, and on the other hand, the dictates of humanity or “morality.”
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The emergence of positive humanitarian law reflects an effort
to codify these tradeoffs. If the “great principle . . . [of] selfpreservation” is reflected in the sanction of lawful killing embedded in the very fabric of the law of war,32 the “immutable
rules of moral obligation” are epitomized by the Martens clause
of the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions, which invokes the
“usages established among civilized peoples,” the “laws of humanity,” and the “dictates of the public conscience.”33
The term “humanitarian law” is a relatively recent, and
somewhat controversial, development.34 It encompasses the
rules of international law designed to regulate both the means
and methods of warfare, and the treatment of particular classes
of individuals during war.35 On the one hand, many commentators use the terms “humanitarian law,” “law of war,” and “law
of armed conflict” interchangeably.36 On the other hand, some
commentators and international actors, including the U.S. Department of State, reject the use of the term “humanitarian
law” in favor of the terms “law of war” or “law and customs of
32. See, e.g., Ganesh Sitaraman, Counterinsurgency, the War on Terror,
and the Laws of War, 95 VA. L. REV. 1745, 1755–57 (2009) (discussing provisions implicitly recognizing that warfare involves killing the enemy).
33. E.g., Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land,
Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 1 Bevans 631 [hereinafter Fourth Hague Convention] (“Until a more complete code of the laws of war has been issued, the High
Contracting Parties deem it expedient to declare that, in cases not included in
the Regulations adopted by them, the inhabitants and the belligerents remain
under the protection and the rule of the principles of the law of nations, as
they result from the usages established among civilized peoples, from the laws
of humanity, and the dictates of the public conscience.”). See generally Theodor
Meron, The Martens Clause, Principles of Humanity, and Dictates of Public
Conscience, 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 78 (2000) (discussing the history and evolution
of the Martens clause).
34. The term was coined by Jean Pictet. See JEAN PICTET, DEVELOPMENT
AND PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 1 (1985). It appears
in several international agreements, including the 1977 Final Act of the diplomatic conference that concluded the 1977 Geneva Protocols I and II, and the
1993 ICTY and 1994 ICTR statutes. See DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR,
supra note 1, at 2 n.3.
35. See THE HANDBOOK OF HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED CONFLICTS 8–9
(Dieter Fleck ed., 1995).
36. E.g., Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, War Everywhere: Rights, National Security Law, and the Law of Armed Conflict in the Age of Terror, 153 U. PA. L.
REV. 675, 761 (2004) (noting the debate on the issue and using the terms interchangeably); Richard D. Rosen, Targeting Enemy Forces in the War on Terror: Preserving Civilian Immunity, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 683, 685 n.4
(2009) (“Although I prefer the terms ‘law of war’ and ‘law of armed conflict,’ I
use them interchangeably with the more fashionable expression—
‘international humanitarian law.’”).
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war.”37 In this view, the term “humanitarian law” is simply a
more fashionable stand-in for the classic “law of war” formulation,38 whose substitution runs the risk of idealizing what must
remain a self-consciously practical body of international law.39
The term “law of war,” in other words, better conveys that the
law’s application is generally in the rational self-interest of
those applying it,40 and that diaphanous appeals to morality
risk diluting this logic. The very language with which commentators and courts approach this body of law, therefore, is itself
controversial.41
The Court has never used the term “humanitarian” to describe this body of law; rather, it either refers specifically to the
constitutive treaties of humanitarian law or, more generally, to
the “laws of war.” That said, this Article uses the term because
it is particularly helpful in evaluating the Court’s jurisprudence. As described above, the term “humanitarian” is analytically useful to distinguish between different components of the
jus in bello as it existed in the early years of the Republic.
Hence, whatever the merits of the argument—that the use of
the term “humanitarian” threatens the law’s efficacy—a monolithic conception of the “law of war” is not useful in evaluating

37. See Letter from John B. Bellinger, Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep’t of State,
and William J. Haynes, Gen. Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Defense, to Jakob Kellenberger, President, ICRC (Nov. 3, 2006), available at http://www.defenselink
.mil/home/pdf/Customary_International_Humanitiarian_Law.pdf (“Although
[the ICRC study of Customary International Law] uses the term ‘international
humanitarian law,’ we prefer the ‘law of war’ or the ‘laws and customs of
war.’”); see also David E. Graham, The Law of Armed Conflict and the War on
Terrorism, in ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS 331,
331 (Richard B. Jaques ed., 2006) (arguing that no one has advanced a definitive explanation for the use of the term “international humanitarian law”);
Adam Roberts, Implementation of the Laws of War in Late-Twentieth-Century
Conflicts, in THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT INTO THE NEXT MILLENNIUM 359,
381 (Michael N. Schmitt & Leslie C. Green eds., 1998).
38. Rosen, supra note 36, at 685 n.4.
39. Roberts, supra note 37, at 381.
40. For the classic formulation of the argument casting the law of war as
utilitarian calculus, see R.B. Brandt, Utilitarianism and the Rules of War, 1
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 145, 145–65 (1972).
41. For his part, Pictet explains the utility of the term as follows:
When [I] first proposed the term ‘humanitarian law’ [I] was told that
it combined two ideas of different natures, one legal and the other
moral. Well, the provisions constituting this discipline are in fact a
transposition into international law of moral, and more specifically, of
humanitarian concerns. Accordingly, the name seems satisfactory.
PICTET, supra note 34, at 1.
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the Supreme Court’s approach to this body of law.42 The matter
is further complicated because the Court uses the term to refer
not just to international humanitarian law, including rules codified in the Hague and Geneva Conventions, but also to this
body of law as interpreted and developed by U.S. military
courts and tribunals.43 Therefore, in assessing the Supreme
Court’s treatment of the “law of war,” there exists a preliminary task of understanding to which body of law the Court is
referring. This Article uses the term “humanitarian law” to aid
that process.
In the wake of the U.S. Civil War, counsel for the United
States described the law of war for the Court as “the laws
which govern the conduct of belligerents towards each other
and other nations, flagranti bello.”44 Helpful as far as it goes,
this definition offers a useful starting point. The Court purports
to recognize and apply this body of law from its earliest days.45
42. As will become evident in Part I.B, infra, these terminological distinctions are of particular relevance in assessing the Court’s historical treatment
of the law of war.
43. See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 689 (2006) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (defining the “common law of war as it pertains to offenses triable
by military commission” as “derived from the experience of our wars and our
wartime tribunals and the laws and usages of war as understood and practiced
by the civilized nations of the world” (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted)), superseded by statute, Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L.
No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600; see also John Cerone, Jurisdiction and Power:
The Intersection of Human Rights Law and the Law of Non-International
Armed Conflict in an Extraterritorial Context, 40 ISRAEL L. REV. 396, 410 n.39
(2007) (noting ambiguity as to the meaning of the term in the U.S. legal system). The blurring of the distinction between the law of nations, of which the
law of war forms a part, and its interpretation and elaboration by domestic
courts has long been a feature of the Court’s treatment of the law of war. See,
e.g., The Sally, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 382, 384 (1814) (“The municipal forfeiture
under the non-intercourse act, was absorbed in the more general operation of
the law of war. The property of an enemy seems hardly to be within the purview of mere municipal regulations; but is confiscable under the jus gentium.”); Rose v. Himley, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 241, 256 n.* (1808) (“[France], as
Britain did in our revolutionary war, clothes her prohibitions in the shape of
municipal regulations, thereby pretending to assert her claim of jurisdiction
over her revolted subjects . . . but we . . . recognize her rights only so far as
they are sanctioned by the laws of a war of the nature of that in which she is
engaged, and no further; and they do not bind us further than the laws of war
. . . .”), overruled in part by Hudson v. Guestier, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 281 (1810).
44. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 14 (1866) (quoting the argument
of the United States).
45. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 27–28 (1942) (“[F]rom the very beginning
of its history this Court has recognized and applied the law of war as including
that part of the law of nations which prescribes, for the conduct of war, the
status, rights and duties of enemy nations as well as of enemy individuals.”).
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It is to the content of this recognition and application that this
Article now turns.
B. THE COURT’S EARLY REFERENCES
It is helpful to view the Court’s early references to the law
of war against the background of the development of modern
humanitarian law. In contrast to the well-developed customary
law of naval captures, there was little effort to codify the rules
of war on land until the 1863 Code of Francis Lieber.46 The Lieber Code helped to spur the eventual development of the first
treaty for the law of war on land at Brussels in 1874 and, later,
the first Hague Conference in 1899.47 The Lieber Code thus
provides a useful milestone in evaluating the Court’s jurisprudence. These developments contributed to a shift in the normative foundations of the law of war during this time, as humanitarian concerns gradually assumed greater importance.48 The
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence reflects this development. As
described below, before the Lieber Code most of the Court’s references to the “laws of war” refer to aspects that cannot properly be understood as “humanitarian.” Rather, the focus in these
cases is mercantile commerce.
The early Court identified numerous such propositions.
The most common context in which the Court appealed to the
law of war is the seizure of property, particularly the capture of
vessels or cargo under the law of prize, which is the elaborate
set of customary rules governing the seizure of property on the
high seas.49 The Court recognized, for example, that the law of
46. GENERAL ORDER NO. 100: INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF
ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE FIELD (Apr. 24, 1863) [hereinafter Lieber Code], reprinted in 2 THE MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS OF FRANCIS LIEBER
245–74 (1881); see also GREEN, supra note 17, at 29 n.63 (identifying the Lieber Code as the “first modern codification of the law of armed conflict”).
47. For a concise history of the laws of war, see DAVID J. BEDERMAN,
INTERNATIONAL LAW FRAMEWORKS 237–44 (2006). For a more thorough
treatment, see GREEN, supra note 17, at 20–53.
48. See THEODOR MERON, WAR CRIMES LAW COMES OF AGE 139–40
(1998); Theodor Meron, The Humanization of Humanitarian Law, 94 AM. J.
INT’L L. 239, 244 –45 (2000).
49. E.g., United States v. Reading, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 1, 10 (1855) (“[B]y
the law of war either party to it may receive and list among his troops such as
quit the other, unless there has been a previous stipulation that they shall not
be received.”); De Valengin’s Adm’rs v. Duffy, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 282, 289–90
(1840) (“It has been frequently held, that the device . . . of covering the property as neutral when in truth it was belligerent, is not contrary to the laws of
war, or the laws of nations.”); The Caledonian, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 100, 102
(1819) (“By the general law of war, every American ship, sailing under the
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war permitted the seizure and destruction of enemy property.50
Outside the prize context, the Court invoked the law of war
with respect to commerce and trade relations,51 the validity of
contracts,52 and title or right to land.53 Indeed, the Court seempass, or license of the enemy, or trading with the enemy, is deemed to be an
enemy’s ship, and forfeited as prize.”); The St. Lawrence, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch)
120, 122 (1815) (referring to traffic in goods as being “not only prohibited by
the law of war, but [also] by the municipal regulations of his adopted country,”
thus condemning it to forfeiture); The Frances, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 335, 342
(1814) (referring to instructions by the President to privateers of the United
States giving them authority “to capture all property liable to capture by the
laws of war”); The Venus, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 253, 260 (1814) (“If Jones had a
right to stop these goods in tranitu, so had the United States, who, by the laws
of war, succeeded to his rights.”); Maley v. Shattuck, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 458,
488 (1806) (“It is well known, that a vessel libelled as enemy’s property, is
condemned as prize . . . . If, for example, a search be resisted, or an attempt be
made to enter a blockaded port, the laws of war, as exercised by belligerents,
authorize a condemnation as enemy’s property . . . .”); Hannay v. Eve, 7 U.S. (3
Cranch) 242, 247 (1806) (holding the contract invalid as fraud even though
“[t]he agreement to save the ship and cargo, under the semblance of a condemnation, was not, in itself, an immoral act; it was, as has been truly said, a
stratagem which the laws of war would authorize”); Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S.
(1 Cranch) 1, 17 (1801) (recounting that the capture of a neutral vessel was to
be judged “according to the laws of war, that is, according to the law of nations
as applicable to a state of war”); The Amelia, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 34, 35 (1800);
Talbot v. Jansen, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 133, 148 (1795); Penhallow v. Doane’s
Adm’rs, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 54, 74 (1795).
50. Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110, 122–23 (1814) (“That
war gives to the sovereign full right to take the persons and confiscate the
property of the enemy wherever found, is conceded. The mitigations of this rigid rule, which the humane and wise policy of modern times has introduced into practice, will more or less affect the exercise of this right, but cannot impair
the right itself.”). As Brown illustrates, in the early nineteenth century there
were no law-of-war limits on the power to seize and destroy enemy property.
Not until the advent of the Lieber Code was this principle subject to formal
limits. See Burrus M. Carnahan, Lincoln, Lieber and the Laws of War: The
Origins and Limits of the Principle of Military Necessity, 92 AM. J. INT’L L.
213, 217 (1998).
51. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 77 (1804)
(“By the general laws of war, a belligerent has a right not only to search for
her enemy, but for her citizens trading with her enemy.”); see also United
States v. Guillem, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 47, 59 (1850) (“Whether or not gold and
silver are to be considered as merchandise in regard to the laws of war, will
depend on the purposes for which they are shipped.”). States seized enemy
property to weaken the adversary’s military strength. Hence, the law of war
relating to commerce cannot be disconnected from its content as to seizures.
See, e.g., The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 671–72 (1862) (noting that
the law of war recognizes the right of a belligerent to capture the property of
an enemy on the high seas as a means to “cut these sinews of power” rooted in
wealth, the products of agriculture, and commerce).
52. White v. Burnley, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 235, 249 (1857) (“When one nation is at war with another nation, all the subjects or citizens of the one are
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ingly framed its analysis of conduct during armed conflict as
involving a distinct, parallel system of laws, rights, and obligations.54
In addition to the law of war’s content as to property,
commerce, and contracts, the early Court made several references to the rights and duties of belligerents. In United States
v. Reading, for example, the Court noted that by the law of war
“either party to [the conflict] may receive and list among his
troops such as quit the other, unless there has been a previous
stipulation that they shall not be received.”55 The Court has also affirmed the basic principle that the law of war exempts belligerents for certain acts done during war.56
As to domestic applicability, the Court’s early interpretation seems to be that the law of war was binding only to the extent that Congress had declared war.57 Similarly, the Court
deemed in hostility to the subjects or citizens of the other; they are personally
at war with each other, and have no capacity to contract.”); Scholefield v. Eichelberger, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 586, 593 (1833) (declining to adopt an exception to
the doctrine that “during a state of hostility, the citizens of the hostile states
are incapable of contracting with each other . . . . [S]uch a relaxation of the
laws of war is not to be inferred from ordinary circumstances . . . .”); Patton v.
Nicholson, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 204, 207 n.9 (1818) (stating that an act of Congress prohibiting the use of certain licenses issued by belligerent governments
were “merely cumulative upon the pre-existing law of war” and that “as a [corollary] from this principle . . . a contract for the purchase or sale of such a license is void as being founded on an illegal consideration”). The notion that
the law of war provides that all citizens of belligerent states are presumed to
be personally at war with one another exposes a fundamental difference between this usage of the term and the Court’s later usage, consistent with the
evolution of a distinctly humanitarian law of war: IHL emphatically distinguishes between combatants and noncombatants. Only belligerents are
deemed to be at war with one another.
53. See United States v. Castillero, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 17, 359 (1862) (consulting writers on the laws of war to determine the rights acquired by the
United States by its conquest of Mexican territory); Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S.
(16 Pet.) 367, 427 (1842) (discussing Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.)
543 (1823)); McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 581 (“[T]itle was respected until
the revolution, when it was forfeited by the laws of war.”).
54. Cf. United States v. Reading, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 1, 10 (1855) (“War has
its incidents and rights for persons and for nations, unlike any that can occur
in a time of peace . . . .”).
55. Id.
56. See Caperton v. Bowyer, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 216, 225 (1871) (“[L]aws of
war . . . exempt[ ] one engaged in war for certain acts done in the prosecution
thereof [because] international law is a law of the United States, of the nation,
and not of the several States.”).
57. See Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 77
(1804) (“So far as Congress have thought proper to legislate us into a state of
war, the law of nations in war is to apply.”); Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (1
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made clear that the law of war was not judicially enforceable,
i.e., that redress for a violation could be sought only in a belligerent’s political capacity and not by an individual through the
courts.58 It is worth highlighting that this question of judicial
enforceability remains unanswered as to the 1949 Geneva Conventions.59 The Court has yet to decide whether the conventions are self-executing.60
What, then, of “humanitarian” law? As noted above, the
Court has implicitly referred to humanitarian law principles
long before the Lieber Code. In the familiar context of customary rules pertaining to the use of force at sea, Justice Johnson
alluded to the early development of humanitarian law: “The
good sense of mankind has lessened [the] horrors [of war] on
land, and it is scarcely possible to find any sufficient reason
why an analogous reformation should not take place upon the
ocean.”61 Fifteen years later, in contemplating an exception to
the doctrine that citizens of hostile states cannot enter into
Cranch) 1, 28 (1801) (“It is not denied . . . that congress may authorize general
hostilities, in which case the general laws of war apply to our situation; or partial hostilities, in which case the laws of war, so far as they actually apply to
our situation, must be noticed.”). Indeed, prior to the 1949 Conventions, the
law of war became applicable as a function of the existence of a “state of war.”
See Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 2,
July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803, 1 Bevans 247 [hereinafter Second Hague Convention] (noting that regulations were applicable “in case of war”); see also INT’L
COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY, III GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE
TO THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR 19–21 (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1960)
[hereinafter Pictet, POW COMMENTARY] (noting states’ manipulation of
whether a state of war exists and suggesting that the 1949 conventions attempted to “find a remedy to this state of affairs”).
58. See Young v. United States, 97 U.S. 39, 60 (1877) (noting that if a belligerent “offends against the accepted laws of nations, he must answer in his
political capacity to other nations[,] . . . . [o]ther nations may join his enemy,
and enter the conflict against him . . . . [, and] an aggrieved enemy must look
alone for his indemnity to the terms upon which he agrees to close the conflict”);
see also The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 558, 572 (1874) (likening the effect
of maritime law to “international law or the laws of war, which have the effect
of law in no country any further than they are accepted and received as such”).
59. See Noriega v. Pastrana, 130 S. Ct. 1002, 1002 (2010) (Thomas, J., dissenting). In FTC v. A.P.W. Paper, the Court elided a full airing of whether the
1929 Convention was self-executing, 328 U.S. 193, 203 (1946),but soon thereafter stated that the obvious scheme of the Convention was to entrust the political branches with enforcement responsibility. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339
U.S. 763, 789 n.14 (1950) (holding that the “obvious scheme of the agreement”
is for enforcement to be on “political and military authorities”).
60. See Noriega, 130 S. Ct. at 1002 (showing that the question of whether
the “Geneva Conventions are self-executing” is still outstanding).
61. The Atlanta, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 409, 429 (1818) (Johnson, J.,
concurring).
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binding contracts, Justice Johnson remarked that the “general
rule in international law, that the severities of war are to be
diminished by all safe and practical means” may in fact militate in favor of such an exception.62 Similarly vague, yet unmistakable references to humanitarian principles as embodied in
the law of war, while not commonplace, dot the landscape of the
Court’s references to the law of war.63
In Luther v. Borden, predating the Lieber Code by fourteen
years, the Court first alluded more explicitly to the substance of
humanitarian law.64 Enrolled in the state infantry during the
Dorr Rebellion, a citizens’ insurrection mounted to overthrow
the New Hampshire state government, Borden broke into
Luther’s house to search the premises and arrest Luther, who
was suspected of aiding and abetting the insurrection.65 Upon
Luther’s action for trespass, the Court opined, “[w]hen belligerent measures do become authorized by extreme resistance,
and a legitimate state of war exists, and civil authority is prostrate, and violence and bloodshed seem the last desperate
resort, yet war measures must be kept within certain restraints
in all civil contests in all civilized communities.”66
The Court quoted Swiss philosopher Emerich de Vattel for
the proposition that “‘[t]he common laws of war, those maxims
of humanity, moderation, and honor,’ which should characterize other wars . . . ‘ought to be observed by both parties in every
civil war.’”67 Pointing out that martial force can only be exer62. Scholefield v. Eichelberger, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 586, 593 (1833). The
Court, however, ultimately declined to recognize such an exception on the
facts before it. See id. (“[I]t may be safely affirmed that there is no such recognized exception.”).
63. See, e.g., United States v. Castillero, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 17, 367 (1862)
(“The doctrine here maintained, that in war, poison and every species of fraud
may rightfully be used, has received the general condemnati[o]n of mankind.”);
Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110, 125, 128 (1814) (discussing confiscation of property during war and making several references to humanity).
64. Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 85 (1849) (referring to humanity
as a common law of war). Luther is best known for its pronouncements about
the legality of martial law and the nonjusticiability of the Guarantee Clause.
See Stephen I. Vladeck, The Field Theory: Martial Law, the Suspension Power,
and the Insurrection Act, 80 TEMP. L. REV. 391, 424 –30 (2007).
65. Luther, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 2. For a historical account of the rebellion,
see generally GEORGE M. DENNISON, THE DORR WAR: REPUBLICANISM ON
TRIAL, 1831–1861 (1976).
66. Luther, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 85.
67. Id. (citation omitted). This language from Vattel is also cited in Williams v. Bruffy, 96 U.S. 176, 191 (1877), and The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black)
635, 667 (1862). For a discussion of Vattel’s influence on the Court’s early juris-
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cised to the extent strictly necessary under the circumstances,68
the Court took care to distinguish between combatants and
noncombatants, stating that the punishment of noncombatants
belongs to the “municipal tribunals, and not to the sword and
bayonet of the military.”69
While the Court ultimately recognized New Hampshire’s
right to put down the rebellion by force and affirmed the judgment in favor of respondent Borden, it dismissed and remanded
as to Luther’s mother, also a plaintiff.70 Pointing to Mrs. Luther’s status as a noncombatant, the Court noted that the lower
courts had not tried “whether any of the rights of war, or rights
of a citizen in civil strife . . . have here . . . been violated.”71 As
such, Borden should have been afforded the opportunity to, “as
by the general rights of war,” justify his conduct.72 In light of
Mrs. Luther’s status as “a female . . . not at all subject to military duty and laws, and . . . not in arms as an opponent,” however, Borden’s prospects on remand were “very doubtful.”73
In several cases during the Civil War and Reconstruction
era, the Court further drew on the customary humanitarian
law of war. The Court both offered general observations about
the nature of the law and elucidated specific propositions.74 Its
observations during this period offer a rough outline of several
provisions that later would be codified at the Hague and in Geneva. Nearly three decades after Luther, for example, the Court
again relied on Vattel for the proposition that the “common
laws of war” are equally applicable to civil war.75 A variation of
prudence, see GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION:
IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 9, 192 n.20 (1996).
68. Luther, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 86 (“[R]ule of force and violence operate
only to a due extent and for a due time, within its appropriate sphere . . . .”).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 88.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 87–88.
74. See Ford v. Surget, 97 U.S. 594, 613 (1878) (“[L]aws of war as established among nations have their foundation in reason, and tend to mitigate
the cruelties and miseries which such conflicts produce.” (citing The Prize
Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 669 (1862))).
75. See Williams v. Bruffy, 96 U.S. 176, 191 (1877) (“[I]n a civil war the
contending parties have a right to claim the enforcement of the same rules
which govern the conduct of armies in wars between independent nations—
rules intended to mitigate the cruelties which would attend mutual reprisals
and retaliations.”). The Court made this point even more explicitly a year later. See Coleman v. Tennessee, 97 U.S. 509, 517 (1878) (“Though the [Civil
War] was not between independent nations, but between different portions of
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this proposition was codified in Common Article 3 of the 1949
Geneva Conventions, which provides baseline protections applicable to conflicts “not of an international character.”76 This
language has traditionally been understood to refer to civil
wars, though as described below the Supreme Court has since
flexed its interpretive muscle to move beyond that view.
Similarly, in the context of territorial conquest, the Court
observed that “the rights of war . . . are mitigated by the laws of
war . . . with respect to the effects of conquest, as well as to the
mode of warfare.”77 This observation can be viewed as foreshadowing the development of the two distinct branches of humanitarian law: Geneva law and Hague law. The former is concerned with the treatment of persons following conquest,
during or after war; the latter is concerned with controlling the
means and methods of warfare.78
C. CONCLUSION
The Court’s early treatment of the “laws of war” suggests
several observations. As a preliminary matter, the term “humanitarian law” is useful from the viewpoints of taxonomy and
analysis. Because the Court’s early references to the “humanitarian” law of war are intertwined with law of war references to
distinct, but related, concepts in international law, the use of
the term “humanitarian” is warranted as a practical matter.
While the Court frequently refers to the law of war, moreover, it uses the term in a humanitarian sense in only a fraction of these instances. Most such references refer to the customary laws governing the conduct of war on the high seas or
relating to the effect of war on commercial relations.79 Nonetheless, along with several vague references, the Court made at
least one explicit reference to humanitarian law principles even
before Francis Lieber’s first modern codification of the humanithe same nation, yet having taken the proportions of a territorial war, the insurgents having become formidable enough to be recognized as belligerents,
the same doctrine must be held to apply.”).
76. E.g., Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter First Geneva Convention].
77. United States v. Castillero, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 17, 368 (1862). But see
Young v. United States, 97 U.S. 39, 60 (1877) (“As a rule, whatever is necessary to [lessen the strength of an adversary] is law-ful [sic]; and, as between
the belligerents, each determines for himself what is necessary.”).
78. See infra notes 89, 182–83 and accompanying text.
79. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
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tarian jus in bello. In Luther v. Borden, the Court hinted at the
principle of distinction between combatants and noncombatants.80 That this reference appears in the context of a domestic
uprising reinforces what the Court twice affirmed during the
Civil War and Reconstruction period: certain humanitarian law
principles apply equally during civil wars.81 Still, it is critical to
distinguish these appeals to the “common law of war” from later references to positive humanitarian law. Before the 1949
Geneva Conventions, internal armed conflicts were governed
exclusively by domestic law.82
Furthermore, as the above discussion of Luther suggests,
the Court offers some pronouncements on the substantive provisions of customary humanitarian law, or the “common law of
war.”83 And finally, the Court’s early references to the law of
war foreshadow a theme that runs throughout its humanitarian law jurisprudence: the Court’s willingness to invoke the law
of war is circumscribed by its deference to the political
branches during wartime.
II. HAGUE LAW
The 1899 meeting of twenty-six states in the Hague gave
birth to Conventions and Declarations that remain part of the
law of war known generally as Hague law.84 A 1907 Conference
adopted ten other Conventions relating to warfare;85 most significant for this analysis are the Convention Relative to the
80. See supra notes 68–69 and accompanying text. See generally 1 JEANMARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUIS DOSWALD-BECK, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED
CROSS, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 3–8 (2005) [hereinafter ICRC, CIHL] (describing the principle of distinction).
81. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
82. See LINDSAY MOIR, THE LAW OF INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICT 18–20
(2002) (discussing the various stages of armed conflict and stating that “[t]he
laws of war were not automatically applicable to internal armed conflicts in
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries”); Pictet, POW COMMENTARY,
supra note 57, at 28 (“Up to 1949, the Geneva Conventions were designed to
assist only the victims of wars between States.”).
83. See supra notes 64 –73.
84. The Declarations banned the launching of projectiles and explosives
from balloons. They did not garner universal support, but are now generally
accepted as expressing customary law, which the U.S. Army Field Manual on
the Law of Land Warfare recognizes as “‘binding on all nations.’” GREEN, supra note 17, at 31 (quoting DEP’T OF THE ARMY, FM 27-10, THE LAW OF LAND
WARFARE ¶ 7(c) (1956)). Notably, the 1899 conference also produced the Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land. See Second
Hague Convention, supra note 57.
85. GREEN, supra note 17, at 32.
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Laws and Customs of War on Land,86 the Convention Relative
to the Opening of Hostilities,87 and the Convention Relative to
the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in War
on Land.88 In general terms, the Hague Conventions and Declarations contain rules relating to the means and methods of
warfare, i.e., to tactical conduct and weapons of war.89 The Supreme Court has cited Hague law in sixteen cases:90 invoking
the Conventions for reasons of definition, as indicia of U.S. government policy, as aids in interpreting statutes, and as a
means to consider directly alleged breaches of the Conventions.
The first such reference appears in 1913,91 just one year before
a scheduled third Hague conference that never took place in the
wake of World War I’s outbreak.92
A. SEEKING DEFINITION: SETTING THE PARAMETERS OF
RELIANCE ON HUMANITARIAN LAW
The Court’s early reliance on Hague law can be seen as
framing its approach to humanitarian law treaties in general.
Broadly speaking, the Court has relied on Hague law for reasons of definition or to seek interpretive guidance. In four cases, the Court invoked Hague law to define particular concepts.93 The most straightforward use of Hague law for
definitional purposes occurs in MacLeod v. United States. In
MacLeod, the Court invoked the Regulations annexed to the
1899 Hague Convention on the Laws and Customs of War on
86. Fourth Hague Convention, supra note 33.
87. Convention Relative to the Opening of Hostilities, Oct. 18, 1907, 36
Stat. 2259, 1 Bevans 619 [hereinafter Third Hague Convention].
88. Convention Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and
Persons in Case of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2310, 1 Bevans 654.
89. See, e.g., MCCOUBREY, supra note 20, at 28.
90. See supra note 6 for a listing of cases. The three cases that cite both
Geneva and Hague law—Hamdan, Hamdi, and Yamashita—are discussed in
infra Part III.
91. See Macleod v. United States, 229 U.S. 416, 425–26 (1913).
92. David Caron, War and International Adjudication: Reflections on the
1899 Peace Conference, 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 4, 22 (2000).
93. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 595–612 (2006) (discussing
whether conspiracy is defined in the Conventions), superseded by statute, Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600; In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 14 –17 (1946) (discussing whether the convention imposes
a duty on commanders to control their troops); Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1,
29–31 & n.7 (1942) (referencing the Hague Convention in the context of defining “persons to whom belligerent rights and duties attach”); MacLeod, 229
U.S. at 425–26 (invoking the Convention to define occupation which “give[s]
the right to exercise governmental authority”).
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Land to define occupation giving rise to governmental rights.94
But the Court’s reliance on Hague law for reasons of definition
does not end there. In Ex parte Quirin, In re Yamashita, and
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the Court turned to Hague law to “define” the charges levied against petitioners, that is, to graft
substance onto the bones of the charges in determining that
they allege (or do not allege) a violation of the law of war.95
Compelled by the law’s incorporation into domestic statute, this
use of Hague law is the most common procedural avenue
through which the Court provides thoughtful analysis of humanitarian law. This section assesses the Court’s “definitional”
approach in MacLeod and Quirin.
Macleod demonstrates the Court’s reliance on Hague law
for definition and its reluctance to do so without the sanction of
the political branches.96 In MacLeod, the petitioner asked the
Court to reverse a court of claims decision dismissing his petition seeking reimbursement from the United States for certain
duties paid under protest upon a cargo of rice imported into the
Philippine Islands three months before the 1898 outbreak of
war with Spain.97 In determining the propriety of exercising
the levy, the Court considered what constituted an “occupation,” which would then give rise to the legitimate exercise of
governmental authority.98 To answer this question, it consulted
the Second Hague Convention. The Court cited two articles defining occupation and the duties of the occupant,99 and then
94. Macleod, 229 U.S. at 425–26. Notably, the Court emphasized an executive order approving the Convention notwithstanding that the United
States had signed and ratified the Convention. Id. at 427.
95. See supra note 93.
96. For example, while the Convention defined occupation, the Court still
looked to presidential “[m]essages and [p]apers” and “executive orders” for
support. Macleod, 229 U.S. at 425–28.
97. Id. at 417–20.
98. Id. at 425.
99. Id. at 426 (“Territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed
under the authority of the hostile army. The occupation applies only to the
territory where such authority is established, and in a position to assert itself.
. . . The authority of the legitimate power having actually passed into the
hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all steps in his power to re-establish
and insure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless
absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country.” (quoting Second Hague
Convention, supra note 57, arts. 42, 43)). In the more recent case of Madsen v.
Kinsella, the Court quoted a parallel provision of the Annex to the Fourth Hague
Convention in elaborating on the President’s “urgent and infinite responsibility” of governing territory occupied by U.S. forces. 343 U.S. 341, 348 & n.13
(1952) (citing Fourth Hague Convention, supra note 33, Annex art. 43).
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noted that President McKinley was “sensible of and disposed to
conform the activities of our Government to the principles of international law and practice.”100 With Hague-based definition
and executive approval in hand, the Court reversed, holding
the payment made to the United States in the Philippines unlawful.101
In the well-known case of Ex parte Quirin, the Court approved the use of military commissions to try eight German
saboteurs.102 In so holding, it engaged in an extensive analysis
of the law of war and appealed to the Fourth Hague Convention
of 1907 to define petitioners’ conduct as unlawful belligerency.103 Quirin offers the paradigmatic example of the most frequent procedural avenue through which the Court approaches
humanitarian law and which tends to yield its most extensive
analysis. Specifically, the Court analyzed humanitarian law to
determine if the charged offense constituted a violation of the
law of war so as to be triable by military commission.104
After receiving training at a sabotage school near Berlin,
the eight Quirin petitioners crossed the Atlantic in two German
submarines and entered the United States under cover of
darkness at beaches in New York and Florida.105 The petitioners were under instructions from the German High Command
to destroy war facilities in the United States in exchange for
salary payments from the German government, but were shortly captured by the FBI in New York and Chicago.106 By order of
the President, petitioners were denied access to civilian courts
and tried by military commission.107

100. Macleod, 229 U.S. at 426. The Court quoted an executive order stating
that taxes and duties levied upon conquered populations “‘are to be used for
the purpose of paying the expenses of government under the military occupation,’” and that such taxation “‘is to be exercised within such limitations that it
may not savor of confiscation.’” Id. (quoting Exec. Order, in 10 MESSAGES AND
PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 208, 210 (May 19, 1898)).
101. Id. at 435 (holding that the payment was “covered by neither the orders of the President nor the ratifying acts of Congress”).
102. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 48 (1942). See generally LOUIS FISHER,
MILITARY TRIBUNALS AND PRESIDENTIAL POWER: AMERICAN REVOLUTION TO
THE WAR ON TERRORISM 91–129 (2005) (describing in depth the background of
the case).
103. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 29–31 & n.7.
104. See id. at 34 –38.
105. Id. at 20–21.
106. Id. at 21–22.
107. Id. at 22–23.
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The petitioners were charged, inter alia, with “violation of
the law of war.”108 Because the Court determined that Article
15 of the Articles of War constituted congressional authorization for trial of offenses against the law of war, it faced the
question of “whether it is within the constitutional power of the
National Government to place petitioners upon trial before a
military commission for the offenses with which they are
charged.”109 Answering this question compelled the Court to
consider “whether any of the acts charged is an offense against
the law of war cognizable before a military tribunal.”110 Not all
law-of-war violations are triable by military commission—
either because U.S. courts do not recognize them as violations
or because the Constitution mandates trial by jury. The Court
thus framed the inquiry as follows: (1) Is the charged offense a
violation of the law of war, and if so, (2) does the Constitution
prohibit trial by military commission? This Article, of course, is
concerned with the former question.111
Accordingly, the Quirin Court surveyed the law of war to
determine if the charge indeed constituted a violation so as to
be cognizable by military commission.112 In performing this
analysis, the Court elucidated several core humanitarian law
principles. First, the Court recognized two foundational distinctions: between (1) “the armed forces and the peaceful populations of belligerent nations,” and (2) “those who are lawful and
unlawful combatants.”113
For the former, the Court cited Article I of the Annex to the
Fourth Hague Convention, which “defines the persons to whom
belligerent rights and duties attach,” as well as a manual of
military law from the British War Office, the official law of war
108. Id. at 23. Specification one of the first charge stated:
[Petitioners] being enemies of the United States and acting for the
German Reich, a belligerent enemy nation, secretly and covertly
passed, in civilian dress, contrary to the law of war, through the military and naval lines and defenses of the United States and went behind
such lines, contrary to the law of war, in civilian dress for the purpose
of committing hostile acts, and, in particular, to destroy certain war
industries, war utilities and war materials within the United States.
Id. at 36.
109. Id. at 29.
110. Id.
111. Id. This inquiry into the charged offenses was necessary because Congress incorporated by reference all offenses against the law of war recognized
as such by that body of law. Id. at 30.
112. See id. at 29–36.
113. Id. at 30–31.
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volume of the German General Staff, and a number of other international law treatises.114 That petitioners removed their army uniforms in an effort to disguise their military identities,
thus violating this principle, was crucial to the Court’s holding
that they were subject to trial by military tribunal.115
As to the second distinction—between lawful and unlawful
combatants—the Court observed that while each category of
persons is subject to capture and detention, unlawful combatants are also subject “to trial and punishment by military tribunals for acts which render their belligerency unlawful.”116
The term “unlawful combatants” is variously defined as
“[s]couts or single soldiers, if disguised,” “[a] messenger or
agent who attempts to steal through the territory occupied by
the enemy,” and “[a]rmed prowlers, by whatever names they
may be called.”117 For this proposition the Court again cited the
British War Manual as well as several treatises.118 It also
pointed to U.S. practice and quoted at length various provisions
of the Lieber Code and the War Department’s Rules of Land
Warfare in concluding that unlawful combatants are “not entitled” to the privileges of a prisoner of war.119
Hague law played a critical role in the Court’s analysis.
The Court reasoned that because the government saw fit to define lawful combatants,120 it therefore impliedly recognized the
existence of the corollary category—unlawful combatants. In
other words, the Court’s reliance on and adoption of the Hague
Convention’s definition of lawful belligerent—armies, militia,
and volunteer forces under the command of a “person responsible for his subordinates,” bearing a “fixed distinctive emblem
recognizable at a distance,” carrying arms openly, and acting in
accordance with the law of war121—served as the launching
114. Id. at 30 n.7.
115. See id. at 31 (holding that “sp[ies] who secretly and without uniform
pass the military lines” are “offenders against the law of war subject to trial
. . . by military tribunals”); William H. Ferrell, III, No Shirt, No Shoes, No Status: Uniforms, Distinction, and Special Operations in International Armed
Conflict, 178 MIL. L. REV. 94, 128 (2003).
116. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 31.
117. Id. at 32–33, 33 n.11 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
118. Id. at 31 n.8.
119. Id. at 34 –36.
120. The definition of lawful belligerent adopted by the War Department’s
Manual was taken from Article 1 of the Annex to the Fourth Hague Convention. Id. at 34.
121. Fourth Hague Convention, supra note 33, Annex, art. 1; see also Quirin, 317 U.S. at 37–38 (“Citizens who associate themselves with the military
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point for its explicit inference of the corollary category: unlawful belligerents. The Court found the principle that unlawful
combatants exist as a separate category both not entitled to
prisoner of war privileges and triable by military tribunal to be
so universally recognized and accepted that “we think it must
be regarded as a rule or principle of the law of war recognized
by this Government by its enactment of the Fifteenth Article of
War.”122 The Court thus held that the charge against petitioners “plainly alleges [a] violation of the law of war,” for which
Congress had authorized trial by military commission.123
Quirin’s treatment of humanitarian law is critical for at
least two reasons. First, the Bush Administration relied heavily
on Quirin to justify its detention of suspected terrorists as
“enemy combatants.”124 Second, as noted above, the Court’s engagement with the law of war to determine whether the
charged offense constituted a violation of the law of war so as to
be triable by military commission represents the first instance
of the most common procedural avenue through which the Supreme Court has engaged humanitarian law.125

arm of the enemy government, and with its aid, guidance and direction enter
this country bent on hostile acts, are enemy belligerents within the meaning of
the Hague Convention and the law of war.”). While the Court quotes the War
Department’s Rules of Land Warfare, it takes care to point out that its definition of lawful belligerent was lifted from the Hague Convention. Id. at 34. The
Court does not make clear a hierarchy of authorities, though it does note that
the United States had signed and ratified the 1907 Convention. Id.
122. Id. at 35–36 (noting the principle’s acceptance “in practice both here
and abroad” and “as valid by authorities on international law”).
123. Id. at 36.
124. See LAWYERS COMM. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, A YEAR OF LOSS:
REEXAMINING CIVIL LIBERTIES SINCE SEPTEMBER 11, 32 n.169 (2002) (noting
the Bush Administration’s reliance on Quirin). For a critical appraisal of the
Bush Administration’s reliance on Quirin, see Jonathan Hafetz, Stretching
Precedent Beyond Recognition: The Misplaced Reliance on World War II Cases
in the War on Terror, 28 REV. LITIG. 365, 367–76 (2008).
125. The Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), which displaced the
Articles of War when it came into effect in 1951, includes a similar jurisdictional hook:
The provisions of this chapter conferring jurisdiction upon courtsmartial do not deprive military commissions, provost courts, or other
military tribunals of concurrent jurisdiction with respect to offenders
or offenses that by statute or by the law of war may be tried by military commissions, provost courts, or other military tribunals.
10 U.S.C. § 821, art. 21 (2006).

1364

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[95:1339

B. HAGUE LAW IN THE CONTEXT OF NAVAL WAR
The Court drew on Hague law relating to naval war in two
cases arising in the context of World War I.126 In one instance,
the Court found Hague law to embody the position of the U.S.
government on the content of customary international law. In
the other instance, the Court rejected the applicability of a different (unsigned) treaty in the face of a contrary congressional
dictate. The use of Hague law in this context—though admittedly outside the narrow definition of quintessentially “humanitarian” law—further demonstrates the Court’s pragmatic use
of humanitarian law treaties.
Exactly one month before the United States abandoned its
long-standing policy of neutrality to enter what would later be
known as World War I, the Supreme Court decided a case that
tested U.S. neutrality.127 In Berg v. British & African Steam
Navigation Co., a German cruiser captured a British steamship
on the high seas.128 Instead of proceeding to a German port or
the nearest accessible neutral port, the Germans guided the
vessel nearly 3000 miles to the U.S. port in Hampton Roads,
Virginia.129 The German Ambassador then notified the U.S.
State Department that Germany intended to keep the ship in
port for an unspecified period of time, and requested that the
British crew be detained in the United States for the duration
of the war.130 The vessel’s owner soon filed suit in U.S. court to
recover the ship, and the Supreme Court was eventually tasked
with deciding whether this use of a U.S. port constituted “a
breach of [U.S.] neutrality under the principles of international
law.”131 The Court answered in the affirmative.132
In describing the U.S. policy of neutrality, the Court drew
on several provisions of the 1907 Hague Convention Concerning the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War.133
These provisions laid out the limited circumstances under
which a prize may dock in a neutral port, and required the neu126. Littlejohn & Co. v. United States, 270 U.S. 215 (1926); Berg v. British
& African Steam Navigation Co., 243 U.S. 124 (1917).
127. Berg, 243 U.S. at 150.
128. Id. at 143–44.
129. Id. at 145.
130. Id. at 146. The prisoners were instead released. Id.
131. Id. at 146–47.
132. Id. at 153.
133. Id. at 150–52 (citing Convention Concerning the Rights and Duties of
Neutral Powers in Naval War, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2415, 1 Bevans 723 [hereinafter Thirteenth Hague Convention]).
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tral power to release a prize brought into its ports under any
other circumstance.134 Importantly, the United States had entered a reservation to a provision of the Convention that would
have allowed states to harbor prizes of war pending adjudication by a prize court.135 The Court noted that the treaty was not
binding for lack of ratification, but nonetheless went on to find
it “very persuasive as showing the attitude of the American
Government when the question is one of international law.”136
After the U.S. declaration of war against Germany on April
6, 1917, the Court again referenced Hague law—if only
promptly and unsurprisingly to reject it.137 Littlejohn & Co. v.
United States began as a damages case arising from the collision of two steamships in New York Harbor.138 After the collision, the question became one of ownership.139 Pursuant to a
Joint Resolution of Congress following the U.S. declaration of
war against Germany, the United States purportedly took possession and title of one of the ill-fated ships—a German merchant ship docked in a U.S. port—and refitted it as an army
transport.140 If the United States indeed owned the vessel at
the time of collision, precedent commanded dismissal of the
damages claim against the United States.141
The Court rejected arguments rooted in provisions of the
Hague Convention Relating to the Status of Enemy Merchant
Ships at the Outbreak of Hostilities which afforded merchant
ships belonging to a belligerent the opportunity to depart the
hostile port at the commencement of hostilities.142 This rejection is hardly surprising because the United States had not
134. Thirteenth Hague Convention, supra note 133, arts. 21–23; see also
Berg, 243 U.S. at 150.
135. M. DELTENRE, RECUEIL GENERAL LOIS ET COUTUMES DE LA GUERRE
413 (1943); THE HAGUE CONVENTIONS AND DECLARATIONS OF 1899 AND 1907,
at 219 (James Brown Scott ed., 1915).
136. Berg, 243 U.S. at 151. In fact, the United States acceded to the treaty
on December 3, 1909. See DELTENRE, supra note 135, at 415; THE HAGUE
CONVENTIONS AND DECLARATIONS OF 1899 AND 1907, supra note 135, at 217;
see also Manley O. Hudson, Present Status of the Hague Conventions of 1899
and 1907, 25 AM J. INT’L L. 114, 115–16 (1931) (noting further that the Convention was accepted by the United States prior to August 1914).
137. Littlejohn & Co. v. United States, 270 U.S. 215, 226 (1926).
138. Id. at 218.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 224 (citing The Western Maid, 257 U.S. 419 (1922)).
142. Convention Relating to the Status of Enemy Merchant Ships at the
Outbreak of Hostilities arts. 1, 2, reprinted in 2 AM. J. INT’L L. 127, 129
(Supp. 1908).
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signed the treaty, and because Congress had directly spoken to
the issue. Noting that “[t]he United States did not approve that
Convention,” the Court concluded: “In the absence of convention every government may pursue what policy it thinks best
concerning seizure and confiscation of enemy ships in its harbors when war occurs.”143 Although these cases reveal little of
substance about humanitarian law, they further illustrate the
Court’s flexible and pragmatic approach to humanitarian law
treaties.
C. ASSESSING ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF HAGUE LAW:
INSTITUTIONAL RELUCTANCE
Three cases presented the Court with the opportunity to
address alleged violations of the Hague Conventions. In all
three cases, the Court declined to do so. Yet notwithstanding
this reluctance to consider explicitly claims allegedly arising
under Hague law, the Court drew several conclusions as to the
substance of the Conventions.
In Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., the Court responded to an
action in replevin to recover a consignment of hides allegedly
conveyed in violation of the Fourth Hague Convention.144 The
case arose from events of the Mexican Revolution, the relevant
facts of which follow. After the assassination of President Francisco Madero, General Victoriano Huerta declared himself President of the Republic.145 A month later, the governor of Coahuila, Venustiano Carranza, initiated a revolution against the
Huerta government.146 After capturing the Cuahuila town of
Torreon, where the original owner of the goods at issue did
business, Francisco Villa—a powerful revolutionary general
opposed to the Huerta government—levied a tax on its inhabitants.147 Loyal to the ill-fated Huerta government, the owner
fled Torreon upon its capture and General Villa’s forces seized
the hides to satisfy the military tax.148 The plaintiff claimed
title as the assignee of the original owner, while the defendant
claimed to own the hides through purchase from a Texas corporation that allegedly acquired them from General Villa.149
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Littlejohn & Co., 270 U.S. at 226.
Oetjen v. Cent. Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 299, 301 (1918).
Id. at 299.
Id. at 300.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 299.
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Petitioner claimed that because the property was taken in
violation of Article 46 of the Regulations annexed to the Fourth
Hague Convention, which provided that “private property cannot be confiscated,” no title to the goods passed to the Texas
corporation and thus to respondent.150 The Court declined to
consider the validity of the tax levied by General Villa and thus
decided the case on a mix of act of state and political question
grounds.151 It pointed out, however, that the language relied
upon by petitioner “does not have the scope claimed for it” in
view of other provisions of the Regulations, which recognized
the right of the occupying power to levy “money contributions”
under certain circumstances.152 The Court also made the preliminary observation that “[i]t would, perhaps, be sufficient answer to this contention to say that the Hague Conventions are
international in character, designed and adapted to regulate international warfare, and that they do not, in terms or in purpose, apply to a civil war.”153 Therefore, although the Court
concluded that it could not pass on the validity of the Hague
Convention claim because General Villa was acting as an agent
of the “legitimate” Mexican government,154 it nonetheless engaged the Hague Convention to demonstrate that petitioner’s
claim would likely fail on its own terms.155
In Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,156 the standard
citation case for the act of state doctrine, the Court speculated
further about the expropriation at issue in Oetjen and elaborated on its statement in dicta that the Hague Convention did
not prohibit it.157 The Sabbatino Court observed that the expropriation by the then-rebel government would not violate in150. Id. at 301 (citing Fourth Hague Convention, supra note 33).
151. Id. at 302 (“The conduct of the foreign relations of our Government is
committed by the Constitution to the Executive and Legislative—‘the political’—
departments of the Government, and the propriety of what may be done in the
exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision.”).
152. Id. at 301 (quoting Fourth Hague Convention, supra note 33, arts. 46, 49).
153. Id.
154. The United States had since recognized the Carranza government:
[W]hen a government which originates in revolution or revolt is recognized by the political department of our government as the de jure
government of the country in which it is established, such recognition
is retroactive in effect and validates all the actions and conduct of the
government so recognized from the commencement of its existence.
Id. at 302–03.
155. See id. at 303–04.
156. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
157. Id. at 417.

1368

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[95:1339

ternational law even as applied to non-Mexicans.158 Discussing
the contemporaneous case of Ricaud v. American Metal Co.,159
in which the Court passed on a similar seizure of property during the Mexican revolution, the Sabbatino Court stated of the
seizure: the “declaration of legality in the Hague Convention,
and the international rules of war on seizures, rendered the allegation of an international law violation in Ricaud sufficiently
frivolous so that consideration on the merits was unnecessary.”160 The Court thus expressed a clear view that the Fourth
Hague Convention of 1907 and customary international law
permitted governmental seizure of property during war in certain circumstances.161 In this way, the Court interpreted the
substance of the Fourth Hague Convention notwithstanding its
reluctance to address individual claims that allegedly arose
under it.
In a World War II-era case, the Court again declined to
consider a claim allegedly arising under the Fourth Hague
Convention. In a petition for writ of mandamus, Kumezo Kawato asked the Court to allow his suit for unpaid wages and other
compensation to proceed against the owner of a vessel on which
he worked.162 The owners of the ship moved to abate the action
on the ground that Kawato had become an enemy alien following the U.S. declaration of war against Japan, and hence had
“no right to prosecute any action in any court of the United
States during the pendency of said war.”163 Kawato argued that
Article 23(h) of the Fourth Hague Convention Regulations allowed him to proceed.164 The Court declined to consider Kawato’s rights under “[a]pplicable treaties,” and dispensed with his
Hague Convention argument in a footnote.165 Noting that the
question had never before been raised in the United States, the
Court pointed out that the clause was added to a predecessor
convention “without substantial discussion” and cited an Eng158. Id. at 443 n.2.
159. 246 U.S. 304 (1918).
160. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 444 n.2.
161. Id. at 416–19.
162. Ex parte Kawato, 317 U.S. 69, 70 (1942).
163. Id. at 70–71 (internal quotation marks omitted).
164. Article 23(h) provides: “It is especially prohibited . . . to declare abolished, suspended, or inadmissible in a Court of law the rights and action of the
nationals of the hostile party.” Id. at 72 n.1 (citing Fourth Hague Convention,
supra note 33).
165. Id. at 72 & n.1 (“Applicable treaties are ambiguous and should not be
interpreted without more care than is necessary in this case.”).
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lish case that interpreted the provision to apply “solely in enemy areas occupied by a belligerent,” an interpretation that was
“repeated with approval” in an address by a member of the
House.166
Hague law again arose in the more recent sovereign immunity case of Austria v. Altmann. In Altmann, the Supreme
Court held that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA),
and hence the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity, applied
retroactively, allowing Altmann to bring her claim to recover
paintings taken by the Nazis during the German occupation of
Austria.167 Altmann claimed that Austria’s acquisition of the
paintings violated either customary international law or Article
56 of the Fourth Hague Convention168 and hence fell within the
FSIA’s expropriation exemption—depriving Austria of sovereign immunity “in any case” where it “is engaged in a commercial activity in the United States” and the case is one “in which
rights in property taken in violation of international law are in
issue.”169 Only Justice Breyer, in a separate concurrence, specifically noted that the alleged violation of international law in
question was the violation of the Hague provision or customary
international law.170 The Court emphasized the narrowness of
its holding and expressly disclaimed reviewing the lower court’s
pronouncement that the seizure was in violation of international law.171 While the majority’s decision as to retroactivity of
the FSIA cannot be read as a substantive pronouncement on
the content of the Hague provision, the Court’s reticence to address the alleged violation of the treaty is in line with its approach in Oetjen and Ex parte Kawato.
In sum, the picture that emerges from the Court’s treatment of claims allegedly arising under Hague law is one of reserve. The Court is reluctant to find a violation of the Hague
Conventions, or to decide what rights they may confer upon pe166. Id. at 72 n.1.
167. Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 688 (2004).
168. Id. at 707 (Breyer, J., concurring); see also Fourth Hague Convention,
supra note 33, art. 56 (“All seizure of . . . works of art . . . is forbidden, and
should be made the subject of legal proceedings.”).
169. Altmann, 541 U.S. at 706 (Breyer, J., concurring) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) (2006)).
170. Id. at 707.
171. Id. at 700. The Ninth Circuit held that the seizure “explicitly violated
both Austria’s and Germany’s obligations under the Hague Convention,” and
pointed to “[a] number of the treaty’s accompanying regulations [that] are directly on point,” namely articles 46, 47, and 56. Altmann v. Republic of Austria, 317 F.3d 954, 965 & n.3 (9th Cir. 2002).
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titioners. Nonetheless, the Court does not always reject Hague
arguments out of hand; even when abstaining, the Court offers
varying levels of analysis of the provisions at issue. On one end
of the spectrum, the Court went out of its way in Oetjen to point
out that petitioner’s reading of the Convention cannot withstand scrutiny.172 In a later case, the Court elaborated on this
point, making plain its view that Hague law does not categorically prohibit government seizure of property in war.173 In the
middle of the spectrum, the Kawato court referenced the drafting history of the 1899 Convention, but ultimately discounted
petitioner’s argument, providing no independent analysis and
drawing no independent conclusions. On the other end of the
spectrum, in Altmann, the Court altogether declined to address
the alleged violation of the Hague Convention.174 Apart from a
baseline reticence to address alleged violations, therefore, the
Court’s approach is not amenable to simple categorization.
D. HAGUE LAW OUTSIDE OF ARMED CONFLICT: ISOLATED AND
BRIEF
The Court has cited Hague law outside the context of
armed conflict for a variety of propositions tangential to the
outcomes of the cases. Such references suggest little more than
that the Court is willing to resort to Hague law as persuasive
authority as to non-dispositive matters.
At least one member of the Court has invoked Hague law
outside of armed conflict in four cases. In a case involving a
Federal Tort Claims Act suit against the United States, the
Court cited the Second Hague Convention in referencing U.S.
obligations as an occupying power following World War II.175 In
a First Amendment case, discussing the tension between the
religion clauses, Justice Brennan juxtaposed the apparently
one-dimensional mandate of Article XVIII of the 1899 Hague
Regulations176 with the “difficult problems in connection with
172. Oetjen v. Cent. Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 301–02 (1918).
173. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 416–17 (1964).
174. Altmann, 541 U.S. at 700.
175. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 19 n.2 (1953) (citing Second
Hague Convention, supra note 57).
176. “Prisoners of war shall enjoy every latitude in the exercise of their religion, including attendance at their own church services, provided only they
comply with the regulations for order and police issued by the military authorities.” Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 297 n.72 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citing Second Hague Convention, supra note 57). Justice
Brennan took the quote from AMERICAN STATE PAPERS AND RELATED
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chaplains and religious exercises in prisons” that have arisen in
U.S. courts.177 In a case involving the standards governing the
preparation and review of reports by commissions appointed to
determine just compensation in eminent domain proceedings,
the Court cited the 1907 Hague Convention Relative to the
Creation of an International Prize Court for the proposition
that an arbitration award “must give the reasons on which it is
based.”178
In a Cold War-era immigration case, Harisiades v.
Shaughnessy, the Court—faced with the question of whether
the government may constitutionally deport a resident alien for
membership in the Communist Party—observed that a resident
alien derives rights from both U.S. and international law, and
is hence subject to a different set of obligations vis-à-vis the
government than are citizens.179 The Court cited the Fourth
Hague Convention for one such difference: that the government
cannot compel aliens “to take part in the operations of war directed against their own country.”180 The Court ultimately
adopted a very deferential stance, concluding that the government’s policy toward aliens is a political question in which the
judiciary should not meddle: “Such matters are so exclusively
entrusted to the political branches of government as to be
largely immune from judicial inquiry or interference.”181
In none of these instances is the Court’s reliance on Hague
law dispositive to the outcome of the case. In short, these cases
demonstrate that the Court is willing to rely on Hague law as
DOCUMENTS ON FREEDOM IN RELIGION 313 (William Addison Blakely ed., 4th
rev. ed. 1949).
177. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 297 n.2. The Court thus ostensibly pointed to
the Hague Convention as a document that does not have to navigate the difficult waters between “[e]stablishment” and “[f ]ree exercise.” Id. at 296.
178. United States v. Merz, 376 U.S. 192, 199 n.4 (1964) (citing Thirteenth
Hague Convention, supra note 133). Only after referencing Secretary of State
Hughes’s characterization of the provision to President Harding did the Court
go on to hold that the commissioners must state “not only the end result of
their inquiry, but the process by which they reached it.” Id. at 199.
179. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 585–87 (1952).
180. Id. at 586 (citing Fourth Hague Convention, supra note 33, art. 23).
181. Id. at 587–89 (stating that expulsion of an enemy alien is “a weapon of
defense and reprisal confirmed by international law as a power inherent in
every sovereign state . . . . It is pertinent to observe that any policy toward
aliens is vitally and intricately interwoven with contemporaneous policies in
regard to the conduct of foreign relations, the war power, and the maintenance
of a republican form of government”); see also id. at 596 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“It is not for this Court to reshape a world order based on politically
sovereign States.”).
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persuasive authority as to non-dispositive matters. Even in this
context, when using Hague law as support, rather than illustration, the Court has taken into account the views of the political branches. Not surprisingly, the Court’s reliance on
Hague law in this context does not yield much in the way of informative analysis.
E. CONCLUSIONS
The Supreme Court has referenced Hague law for a variety
of reasons, both inside and outside the context of armed conflict. Several patterns emerge. First, the Court has invoked the
Conventions for reasons of definition. This approach includes
both seeking the definition of specific terms—legal occupancy
in MacLeod—and seeking to define concepts embodied in the
charges levied against detainees seeking their release, as in
Quirin. Second, and relatedly, the Court uses Hague law as an
aid in interpreting statutes. Again, Quirin is the paradigmatic
example; there the Court relied on the Fourth Hague Convention’s definition of “lawful belligerent” to infer the existence of
the corollary category and thus render defendants triable by
military commission and outside the scope of certain IHL protections. Third, the Court references Hague law when asked to
consider an alleged breach of the Conventions or to redress
rights allegedly arising thereunder, tasks it has proven very reluctant to undertake. The Court’s treatment of Hague law is,
unsurprisingly, pragmatic. The Court eschews lengthy disquisitions about the corpus of humanitarian law in favor of more
discrete reliance on particular provisions for definitional or interpretive reasons. It is reluctant to assess alleged violations of
Hague law and has dispensed with them where possible. Still,
the Court has drawn on Hague law in a number of cases, and it
has played a critical role in the disposition of several.
III. GENEVA LAW
The Geneva Conventions of 1929 and 1949182 develop a
system of protection for civilians, noncombatants, and those

182. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter
Fourth Geneva Convention]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter
Third Geneva Convention]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the
Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at
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hors de combat—those “outside the fight,” including the sick,
wounded, and detained.183 The 1949 Conventions are the most
widely recognized and universally accepted codification of humanitarian law.184 It is unsurprising and appropriate, then,
that the Supreme Court offers its most extensive analysis of
humanitarian law in the form of analysis of the Geneva Conventions. This Part systematically reviews the Court’s treatment of Geneva Law—from its first engagement with the 1929
Convention in Yamashita and Johnson v. Eisentrager to its recent reliance on the 1949 Conventions in the “war on terror”
detainee cases.
A. EARLY TREATMENT: YAMASHITA AND EISENTRAGER
In the wake of World War II, the Court decided two cases
best known for their implications for constitutional war powers.
Yamashita and Eisentrager required the Court to engage humanitarian law in several ways. First, the Court addressed alleged violations of the 1929 Geneva Convention. Second, as in
Quirin, the Court probed humanitarian law to define the
charges levied against petitioners to determine whether their
trials by military commission were permissible under domestic
law. This section reviews these issues in turn.
1. Petitioners’ Geneva Claims
The Court’s first reference to the Geneva Conventions in
Yamashita offered detailed analysis of applicable provisions,
but concluded that the Conventions did not apply.185 Four years
later in Eisentrager, while affirming that the detainees in question were “entitled” to the protections of the Convention, the
Court relied on its earlier holding to render them inapplicable.186 The Court’s early view of the applicability of the 1929
Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Second Geneva
Convention]; First Geneva Convention, supra note 76.
183. For a brief summary of the history and core provisions of the 1949
Conventions, see Manooher Mofidi & Amy E. Eckert, “Unlawful Combatants”
or “Prisoners of War”: The Law and Politics of Labels, 36 CORNELL INT’L L.J.
59, 62–73 (2003).
184. According to the ICRC, the Geneva Conventions have achieved universal acceptance, with 194 states parties. Press Release, Int’l Comm. of the
Red Cross, Geneva Conventions of 1949 Achieve Universal Acceptance (Aug.
21, 2006), available at http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/geneva
-conventions-news-210806?OpenDocument&style=custo_print.
185. See In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 6, 20–24 (1946).
186. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 790 (1950) (relying on Quirin
and Yamashita without providing additional analysis).
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Convention seems at first blush to contrast markedly with its
reading of the 1949 Conventions in the “war on terror” context,
namely Hamdan v. Rumsfeld. Specifically, while Hamdan declared Common Article 3 applicable to the armed conflict in
Afghanistan, Yamashita and Eisentrager suggest that the 1929
Convention is not judicially enforceable. This apparent discrepancy can be explained in part by the inclusion in the 1949 Conventions of enhanced individual rights provisions not present in
the 1929 Convention.187 Fully understanding the Court’s more
recent opinions, however, requires a review of these earlier precedents. In short, Yamashita sets the parameters of the Court’s
engagement with the Geneva Conventions and the Eisentrager
Court leans heavily on that decision. Eisentrager, in turn, is the
key precedent at issue in Hamdan’s treatment of humanitarian
law.
The Court first referred to Geneva law in the infamous
World War II-era case of Yamashita.188 The Commanding General of the Japanese Army in the Philippine Islands, Yamashita
became a prisoner of war upon his surrender to U.S. forces on
September 3, 1945.189 He was subsequently charged, tried, and
convicted by military commission of violating the laws of
war.190 Yamashita’s habeas petition charged that his detention
for the purpose of trial was unlawful because the military
commission lacked jurisdiction.191 Specifically, he argued that
the military commission was not lawful because (1) it was
created after the cessation of hostilities, (2) the procedure governing the trial violated domestic and international law, (3) the
charge against him did not constitute a violation of the laws of
war, and (4) the United States failed to notify the neutral power representing Japan, in violation of international law.192 The
187. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 182, art. 146; Third Geneva
Convention, supra note 182, arts. 85, 102; see also GEOFFREY BEST, WAR AND
LAW SINCE 1945, at 80–114 (1994). As explained below, the Hamdan Court
emphasizes these differences between the 1929 and 1949 Conventions.
188. 327 U.S. at 6. Several pre-Yamashita detention cases in the World
War II-era did not raise law of war issues because, for example, the detainee
was held by civilian authorities, Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 297–98 (1944),
or the case was briefed solely on constitutional war powers issues, Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 83 (1943).
189. Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 5.
190. Id. For a biographical portrait and information about Yamashita’s trial, written by one of Yamashita’s lawyers, see generally A. FRANK REEL, THE
CASE OF GENERAL YAMASHITA 17–175 (1949).
191. In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 5–6.
192. Id. at 6.
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latter three rationales occasioned a discussion of humanitarian
law by the Court.193 Indeed, two of Yamashita’s arguments centered on the Geneva Convention of 1929: that the admission of
certain evidence violated Article 63, and that the failure to give
advance notice of his trial to the neutral power representing
Japan as a belligerent violated Article 60.194
Four years later in Eisentrager, the Court considered the
habeas petitions of twenty-one German nationals that had been
tried and convicted by military commission for their involvement in hostilities against the United States after Germany’s
surrender.195 Like Yamashita, the German detainees claimed
that their trial, conviction, and imprisonment violated Articles
60 and 63 of the Geneva Convention of 1929.196
Article 63 of the 1929 Geneva Convention provides: “Sentence may be pronounced against a prisoner of war only by the
same courts and according to the same procedure as in the case
of persons belonging to the armed forces of the detaining Power.”197 Yamashita argued that because he was a prisoner of
war, and because the Articles of War applied to the trial of any
person in the U.S. armed forces, Article 63 afforded him the
protections of Articles 25 and 38 of the Articles of War—that
depositions not be admitted into evidence in a capital case and
that the tribunal apply the “rules of evidence generally recog-

193. Id.
194. Id. Yamashita also argued that (1) the commission was not lawfully
created, (2) the commission failed to charge him with a violation of the laws of
war, and (3) he was deprived of a fair trial in violation of the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Id.
195. Specifically, the detainees were charged with collecting and furnishing
intelligence about the movement of American forces to the Japanese. Johnson
v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 766, 785–86 (1950). The ultimate question in the
case was whether civil courts could properly exercise habeas jurisdiction over
aliens imprisoned abroad under sentences imposed by the executive through
military tribunals. See id. A central point of contention between the majority
and dissent, then, was the extent to which the Court could, and did, properly
evaluate the petitions, as opposed to ruling on jurisdictional grounds. Compare
id. at 791 (“[I]n the present application we find no basis for invoking federal
judicial power in any district . . . .”), with id. at 797 (Black, J., dissenting)
(“Though the scope of habeas corpus review of military tribunal sentences is
narrow, I think it should not be denied to these petitioners and others like
them.”). The Court ultimately decided that it could not exercise jurisdiction,
and affirmed the district court’s dismissal. Id. at 790–91.
196. Id. The Eisentrager petitioners, like Yamashita, also claimed violations of the U.S. Constitution. Id.
197. Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 63, July
27, 1929, 47 Stat. 2021, 118 L.N.T.S. 343 [hereinafter 1929 Convention].
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nized in the trial of criminal cases in the district courts of the
United States,” respectively.198
The Court categorically rejected this argument, concluding
that the Geneva Conventions did not compel application of the
Articles of War and thus “imposed no restrictions upon the procedure to be followed.”199 To reach this conclusion, the Court
contextualized Article 63 by placing it alongside the other two
parts of Chapter 3 of the 1929 Convention, which it asserted,
“taken together,” represented “a comprehensive description of
the substantive offenses which prisoners of war may commit
during their imprisonment, of the penalties which may be imposed on account of such offenses, and of the procedure by
which guilt may be adjudged and pronounced.”200 The Court
thus deemed it “clear” from this context that Article 63 applied
only to proceedings against a prisoner of war “for offenses
committed while a prisoner of war.”201 The Court rejected Yamashita’s argument as to Article 60 of the Convention, also located in Chapter 3, for the same reason.202
In Eisentrager, the Court offered no further analysis of petitioners’ Geneva claims, relying solely on its decisions in Yamashita and Quirin.203 The Court, however, did make several
further observations about the 1929 Convention. It pointed out
that the prisoners did not claim, and that the Convention
would not support, immunity from prosecution for war crimes;
on the contrary, Article 75 of the Convention provided that detention was authorized for prisoners of war throughout trial
and, if necessary, until the end of the punishment.204 In a footnote, the Court affirmed that the prisoners were “entitled” to
the substantive rights guaranteed by the 1929 Convention, but
expressly disclaimed speaking to such rights.205 Rather, responsibility for observing and enforcing these rights was the
198. In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 20–21.
199. Id. at 20; see also Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 790 (noting further that “no
prejudicial disparity is pointed out as between the Commission that tried prisoners and those that would try an offending soldier of the American forces of
like rank”).
200. In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 22–23.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 24.
203. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 789–90 (“This claim the Court has twice considered and twice rejected, holding that such notice is required only of proceedings for disciplinary offenses committed during captivity and not in case of
war crimes committed before capture.”).
204. Id. at 789.
205. Id. at 789 n.14.
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province of the political and military authorities: the rights of
enemy aliens could be vindicated “only through protests and intervention of protecting powers.”206
In Yamashita, Justices Murphy and Rutledge lodged vigorous separate dissents.207 Justice Rutledge argued against the
majority’s contextual reading of Articles 60 and 63 of the Geneva Convention,208 pointing out that it was undisputed that the
Convention was binding upon the United States and further
that the Convention had been followed during Yamashita’s internment.209 Justice Rutledge went out of his way to address
the argument that the Convention’s applicability was in doubt
because Japan had not ratified it,210 noting that “at the beginning of the war both the United States and Japan announced
their intention to adhere to [its] provisions” and citing Article
82 and pertinent portions of the travaux preparatoires for the
proposition that the Convention should be construed to mean
that a state is “bound to apply [its] provisions to prisoners of
war of nonparticipating states.”211 This construction, he argued,
should be adopted for the “security” of captured members of
U.S. armed forces, “if for no other[ reason].”212 In the alternative, Justice Rutledge urged that the treaty be viewed as strong

206. Id. In Hamdan, the government relied upon this footnote for its argument that the 1949 Convention was not judicially enforceable. See Brief for
Respondents at 9, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (No. 05-184) [hereinafter Hamdan Government Brief ].
207. For a thoughtful discussion about the impact of Justice Rutledge’s dissent on the Court’s later jurisprudence, see Craig Green, Wiley Rutledge, Executive Detention, and Judicial Conscience at War, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 99,
154 –70 (2006).
208. In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 74 & n.37 (1946) (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (“This conclusion is derived from the setting in which these Articles are
placed. I do not agree that the context gives any support to this argument.”).
Rutledge proceeded thoroughly to rebut the Court’s analysis, and concluded
that “the meaning of subsection 3 . . . is related to the meaning of subsection 1;
and subsection 1 is no more clearly restricted to punishments and proceedings
in disciplinary matters than is subsection 3.” Id.
209. Id. at 72–73 & n.36 (noting that Yamashita was “interned in conformity with Article 9 of [the] Convention”).
210. In view of his statement that the Court “does not hold that the Geneva
Convention is not binding upon the United States and no such contention has
been made in this case,” id. at 72, there was little reason for Justice Rutledge
to dwell on this point. Nonetheless, he devoted over five hundred words in a
footnote to dispelling any such notion. Id. at 72 n.36.
211. Id. at 72 n.36
212. Id.
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evidence of customary international law, and that it be held
binding as such.213
Justice Rutledge emphasized the pragmatic and strategic
implications of his reading of the Convention. He rooted his
construction of Article 82—that the Convention is binding—on
the safety of captured armed forces, and again cited the safety
of captured U.S. soldiers in arguing that the provisions of the
Articles of War applied to Yamashita.214 Of the argument that
U.S. noncompliance with the 1929 Geneva Convention merely
gave Japan a right of indemnity and that Article 60 conferred
no personal rights upon Yamashita, Justice Rutledge caustically pointed out that “[e]xecuted men are not much aided by postwar claims for indemnity.”215 In short, he characterized the Geneva Convention of 1929 as “our law” and concluded that Yamashita’s trial was violative of it.216
2. Probing Humanitarian Law to Define War Crimes
As in Quirin, discussed above in reference to Hague law,
the need to define the charges levied against General Yamashita and the Eisentrager petitioners provided the second impetus
for the Court to approach humanitarian law in these cases. In
addition to addressing petitioners’ claims allegedly arising under humanitarian law, the Court also drew on the Fourth
Hague Convention and the 1929 Geneva Convention in defining
these charges, and thus demonstrated that petitioners’ trials by
military commission were permissible. The extent to which
these humanitarian law treaties supported the proposition that
the charges against petitioners stated an offense was a matter
of intense disagreement between the majority and the dissents,
particularly in Yamashita.217 Interpretation of humanitarian
law treaties thus became central to the resolution of the cases.
213. Id.
214. Justice Rutledge argued that the Articles of War were applicable both
on their own terms and as a function of Article 63 of the 1929 Geneva Convention. See id. at 61–72.
215. Id. at 77.
216. Id. at 78 (characterizing the failure to provide notice as required by
Article 60 as “only another instance of the commission’s failure to observe the
obligations of our law”).
217. The inquiry was thorny in part because the Hague Conventions and
the 1929 Geneva Convention have few explicit penal provisions. See STEVEN
R. RATNER & JASON S. ABRAMS, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
ATROCITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 81 (2d ed. 2001); see also Yves Sandoz,
Penal Aspects of International Humanitarian Law, in 1 INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW 393, 395–99 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 2d ed. 1999).
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a. Yamashita
The Court in Yamashita echoed Quirin’s observation that
Congress had “not attempted to codify the law of war or to
mark its precise boundaries . . . . [but rather] had incorporated,
by reference, as within the preexisting jurisdiction of military
commissions created by appropriate military command, all offenses which are defined as such by the law of war.”218 Hence,
Yamashita’s trial by military commission was only appropriate
if the charged offense was a violation of the law of war. Yamashita’s challenge, then, tasked the Court with determining
whether the crime charged was, in fact, such a violation.219
Yamashita was charged with “unlawfully disregard[ing]
and fail[ing] to discharge his duty as commander to control the
operations of the members of his command.”220 The Court engaged in a lengthy analysis, concluding that this charge was
indeed recognized by the law of war.221 The bill of particulars
filed against Yamashita further specified the acts for which
Yamashita was alleged to be responsible, including “a deliberate plan and purpose to massacre and exterminate a large part
of the civilian population of Batangas Province . . . as a result of
which more than 25,000 men, women and children, all unarmed noncombatant civilians, were brutally mistreated and
killed.”222 The Court cited the Fourth Hague Convention Regulations in recognizing that these acts constituted violations of
the law of war.223 But because Yamashita did not himself commit these acts, the question was “whether the law of war imposes on an army commander a duty to take such appropriate
measures as are within his power to control the troops under
his command for the prevention of the specified acts which are
218. Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 7–8.
219. Apart from the charge against Yamashita, the Court also noted in dicta another violation of the law of war: “[I]t is a violation of the law of war
. . . to inflict capital punishment on prisoners of war without affording to them
opportunity to make a defense.” Id. at 24 n.10.
220. Id. at 13–14. The charge goes on: “[P]ermitting them to commit brutal
atrocities and other high crimes against people of the United States and of its
allies and dependencies, particularly the Philippines; and . . . thereby violat[ing]
the laws of war.” Id. For a detailed description of the horrors committed by
troops under Yamashita’s command, see Major Michael L. Smidt, Yamashita,
Medina, and Beyond: Command Responsibility in Contemporary Military Operations, 164 MIL. L. REV. 155, 178 n.100 (2000) (citing 4 UNITED NATIONS
WAR CRIMES COMM’N, LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 4 (1948)).
221. See In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 14 –18.
222. Id. at 14.
223. Id.
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violations of the laws of war.”224 The Court concluded that it
did.225
To reach this conclusion, the Court reasoned that because
the failure by a commander to check the excesses of his troops
would almost certainly result in violations of the law of war,
the purpose of the law would be undermined if the commander
could neglect to take such measures with impunity.226 The
Court found support for this reasoning in several humanitarian
law treaties. It cited the Fourth Hague Convention227 and the
Regulations attached thereto,228 the Tenth Hague Convention
relating to the bombardment of naval vessels,229 and the Geneva Convention of 1929,230 and found that these provisions
“plainly imposed” on Yamashita “an affirmative duty” to take
steps to protect prisoners of war and the civilian population.231
Justice Murphy filed a strong dissent, arguing that the
charges against Yamashita were “unrecognized” in international law.232 He chided the Court’s “vague and indefinite references” to the Hague and Geneva Conventions.233 After reviewing various treatises on the laws of war to demonstrate that the
term “responsible” in the context of the Hague provision relied
upon by the majority was ambiguous, Justice Murphy concluded:
224. Id. at 14 –15.
225. Id. at 17.
226. Id. at 15 (“[T]he law of war presupposes that its violation is to be
avoided through the control of the operations of war by commanders who are
to some extent responsible for their subordinates.”).
227. Id. (stating that lawful belligerents must be “commanded by a person
responsible for his subordinates” (citing Fourth Hague Convention, supra note
33, art. 1)).
228. Id. at 16 (noting that Article 43 “requires that the commander of a
force occupying enemy territory, as was petitioner, shall take all the measures
in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety,
while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
229. Id. (“[C]ommanders in chief of the belligerent vessels ‘must see that
the above Articles are properly carried out.’” (citing Fourth Hague Convention,
supra note 33, art. 19)).
230. Id. at 15–16 (noting that Article 26 “makes it the duty of the commanders-in-chief of the belligerent armies to provide for the details of execution of the foregoing articles [of the convention], as well as for unforeseen cases” (brackets in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
231. Id. at 16. The Court goes on to point out that “[o]bviously charges of
violations of the law of war . . . need not be stated with the precision of a common law indictment.” Id. at 17.
232. See id. at 35 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
233. Id. at 36.
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It is apparent beyond dispute that [the term] was not used in this
particular Hague Convention to hold the commander of a defeated
army to any high standard of efficiency when he is under destructive
attack; nor was it used to impute to him any criminal responsibility
for war crimes committed by troops under his command under such
circumstances.234

The other provisions, Justice Murphy stated, were “on their
face equally devoid of relevance.”235
Justice Murphy’s principal criticism was that the Convention provisions did not speak to the unique facts of the case:
they were not relevant where “the troops of a commander commit atrocities while under heavily adverse battle conditions.”236
Moreover, Justice Murphy interpreted language in the Army’s
Basic Field Manual on Rules of Land Warfare to limit individual criminal responsibility for violations of the laws of war to
“those who commit the offenses or who order or direct their
commission.”237 Both Justices Murphy and Rutledge concluded
that the charge against Yamashita was unprecedented, without
sufficient definition in international law, and hence could not
support his trial by military commission.238
b. Eisentrager
In Eisentrager, the Court similarly analyzed the law of war
to determine if the charged offense was cognizable by military
commission. In that case, the Court considered habeas petitions
from twenty-one German nationals who had been tried and
convicted by military commission of violating the law of war by
collecting and furnishing intelligence to the Japanese army
about American troop movements after the German High
Command’s unconditional surrender.239 Repatriated to Germany to serve their sentences, the prisoners were held at
Landsberg Prison, then under U.S. Army control, when the Supreme Court heard the case.240
234. Id. at 37.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 37–38.
238. Id. at 40 (“The only conclusion I can draw is that the charge made
against the petitioner is clearly without precedent in international law or in
the annals of recorded military history.”); id. at 43 (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (“I
have not been able to find precedent for the proceeding in the system of any
nation founded in the basic principles of our constitutional democracy, in the
laws of war or in other internationally binding authority or usage.”).
239. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 765–66 (1950).
240. Id.
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The Eisentrager petitioners claimed that the military
commission lacked jurisdiction because the charge against
them did not allege a violation of the law of war, and vaguely
framed the issue as a violation of Articles I and III of the Constitution.241 The Court cited Quirin and Yamashita in holding
that the military commission was indeed a lawful tribunal in
which to judge enemy offenses against the law of war.242 As to
petitioners’ unclear constitutional challenge to the “jurisdiction” of the military commission, the Court pointed to Congress’s constitutional power to “make rules concerning captures
on land and water, which this Court has construed as an independent substantive power.”243 As in Yamashita and Quirin,
the Eisentrager Court was thus tasked with surveying the law
of war to determine whether the charged offense constituted a
violation. As in these prior cases, the Court again answered in
the affirmative.244
In reaching this conclusion, the Court cited “an old customary rule, since enacted by Article 35 of the Hague Regulations” that “capitulations must be scrupulously adhered to.”245
The Court took pains to point out, however, the very circumscribed role it played in finding that the offense validly charged
a war crime: it was for the military commission to determine
whether, in fact, petitioners had committed the war crime and
whether the law of war applied in the first instance.246 In short,
the Court purported simply to survey the law of war and determine that the charged offense constituted a violation.
Three members of the Court argued in dissent that the issue of the sufficiency of the charge—and hence the Court’s cita241. Id. at 785–86.
242. Id. at 786.
243. Id. at 786–89 (citation omitted). The Court also rooted the commission
in the Commander-in-Chief Clause, noting that petitioner’s challenge thus
represented a “challenge to conduct of diplomatic and foreign affairs, for which
the President is exclusively responsible.” Id.
244. Id. at 787 (“Breach of the terms of an act of surrender is no novelty
among war crimes.”).
245. Id. (quoting Fourth Hague Convention, supra note 33). The Court also
cited, among other authorities, a treatise, which in turn quoted Secretary of
State Daniel Webster: “If there is one rule of the law of war more clear and peremptory than another, it is that compacts between enemies, such as truces and
capitulations, shall be faithfully adhered to . . . .” Id. at 787 n.13 (quoting 7
JOHN B. MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AS EMBODIED IN
DIPLOMATIC DISCUSSIONS, TREATIES, AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL
AGREEMENTS 330 (1906)).
246. Id. at 788.
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tion to humanitarian law—was “wholly irrelevant,” and the
Court’s conclusions in this regard were “gratuitous.”247 In this
view, the only issue raised was whether a civilian court can
hear the habeas petitions. Citing Quirin and Yamashita, the
dissent noted that there was no blanket prohibition on the exercise of habeas jurisdiction over petitions by enemy alien belligerents. Rather, the “clear holding” of those cases was that
habeas jurisdiction is available even to enemy aliens and cannot be denied merely because the prisoners were held outside
U.S. territory.248
After explaining the impropriety of the majority’s inquiry,
Justice Black, writing for the dissent, took issue with the substantive finding that the passing of information to the Japanese
after Germany’s surrender in fact constituted a war crime. If,
as the petition alleged, the prisoners were “under the control of
the armed forces of the Japanese Empire” during the period at
issue, the question of whether obedience to their Japanese
commanders “constitute[ed] ‘unlawful’ belligerency . . . is not so
simple a question as the Court presumes.”249 Justice Black recalled the Court’s caution in Quirin that military tribunals can
punish only “unlawful” combatants. “It must be remembered,”
he wrote, “that legitimate ‘acts of warfare,’ however murderous,
do not justify criminal conviction.”250
3. Understanding the Court’s Early Reliance on Geneva Law
The Court’s use of humanitarian law in Yamashita and Eisentrager suggests several observations. First, the Court offered informative, if controversial, analysis of specific provisions of the Geneva (and Hague) Conventions. The Court’s
application of law to the facts yielded substantive conclusions of
law and pronouncements as to the content of humanitarian
law. Second, the Court purported to analyze the entire corpus
of the “laws of war” to determine whether the offenses charged
constituted violations so as to be cognizable by military commission. Third, the Court affirmed that the Eisentrager detainees are “entitled” to the protections of the 1929 Convention, but
247. Id. at 792–94 (Black, J., dissenting). The dissent further noted that,
even if relevant, the war crimes question was not before the Court, as it was
not reached by the trial court. Id. at 792–93.
248. Id. at 794 –95. A variation of this view, of course, would be adopted by
the Court over fifty years later in Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
See infra Part III.C.
249. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 793 (Black, J., dissenting).
250. Id.
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held the convention inapplicable by relying on Yamashita’s contextual reading of the relevant provisions.
What emerges from the Court’s analysis? First, in terms of
substance, the Yamashita Court rooted the duty of command
responsibility in humanitarian law and identified its breach as
a war crime. While the principle did not originate during World
War II, the decision can be seen as an important contribution to
the development of the doctrine.251
One may counter, as did Justice Rutledge,252 that the
Court’s use of humanitarian law represented a misapplication
of the treaties and was designed to justify the imposition of the
death penalty on a defeated enemy general after the conclusion
of a wrenching world war. Indeed, the Court did not respond to
Justice Rutledge’s point-by-point refutation of its contextual
reading of the Geneva Convention that rendered it inapplicable
to General Yamashita and on which the Court relied in Eisentrager.253 Regardless of the soundness of Yamashita’s textual
analysis of the 1929 Geneva Convention, it is clear that the
Court’s reliance on humanitarian law to ratify Yamashita’s trial and execution is a landmark in the Supreme Court’s treatment of IHL.
Similarly, it is possible to read Eisentrager as a modest
contribution to humanitarian law jurisprudence through its
somewhat less controversial identification of petitioners’ passing of information to the Japanese following Germany’s surrender as a violation of the law of war.254 Justice Black took issue with this finding in dissent, but his criticism was more
circumspect than the dissent in Yamashita, given that the parties did not brief or argue the point.255 Although its declaration
of a war crime is subject to some criticism, the Court relied on
humanitarian law and reached a substantive legal conclusion
based at least in part on this reliance.
251. Command responsibility, of course, is properly located in the domain
of international criminal law, not humanitarian law. Accordingly, the decision’s substantive contribution is not to humanitarian law proper. For a summary of the roots of international criminal responsibility in humanitarian law,
see RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 217, at 80–107; see also Smidt, supra note
220, at 176 (“It was during the war crimes trials themselves that the doctrine
of command responsibility developed. This was the basis for the defense allegation in [Yamashita] that prosecution based on a command responsibility
theory was tantamount to ex post facto law.” (citations omitted)).
252. In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 6, 42–43 (1946) (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
253. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 789.
254. See id. at 778.
255. Id. at 793–94 (Black, J., dissenting).
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Second, in terms of procedure—how the Court invokes humanitarian law—Yamashita and Eisentrager solidified the approach initially adopted in Quirin and discussed above. Specifically, the Court offered robust analysis of humanitarian law in
the course of assessing a charge levied against petitioners to
determine if it properly alleged a violation of the law of war.256
In both Yamashita and Eisentrager, in the course of finding petitioners’ trials by military commission to be lawful, the Court
explicitly applied the law of war—as embodied in the various
Hague Conventions and 1929 Geneva Convention—to the facts
behind the charges levied against them.257
Third, an important contribution of the Supreme Court to
humanitarian law jurisprudence emerges in the interaction between majority and dissent on humanitarian law issues. Here,
it is useful to return to this Article’s point of departure. Humanitarian law treaties generally lack authoritative mechanisms for interpretation—a task principally left to state parties
with some occasional guidance from the International Committee of the Red Cross. One might expect the Supreme Court to
contribute to the global store of humanitarian law decisions by
applying IHL provisions to the facts before it in traditional
common-law fashion, thus yielding authoritative and precedential interpretations from which other bodies faced with similar
issues might draw. And yet, because other interpretive bodies
and mechanisms (treaty bodies, foreign courts, thematic mechanisms of the United Nations, and so on) do not perceive the
Court’s pronouncements as “binding,” such bodies are likely to
give dissenting opinions greater consideration in drawing on
Supreme Court precedent as persuasive authority. While a
united Court, of course, speaks more loudly than a lone dissenter, a more thorough humanitarian law analysis in a dissent
may prove more useful to another interpretive body than an inferior analysis that garners a majority. In other words, to the
256. Again, it is the law of war’s incorporation into the Articles of War, supra
notes 109–11 and accompanying text, and later into the UCMJ, supra note 125
and accompanying text, that prompts the Court’s humanitarian law analysis.
257. It is the majority’s application of the law to the facts that draws the
dissent’s strongest criticism. Black argues that the facts do not support the
majority’s hasty leap to the identification of a war crime. If petitioners were in
fact under the control of the Japanese forces, their acts may have been “legitimate ‘acts of warfare,’” which do not justify criminal conviction. Eisentrager,
339 U.S. at 793 (Black, J., dissenting). There is thus some question about how
thoughtfully the Court applied the law to the facts. The point remains, however, that the Court offers explicit analysis of the facts against a well-defined
legal standard. See id. at 787–88 (majority opinion).
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extent one is interested in the content and quality of the humanitarian law analysis rather than the mere holding of the
case, Yamashita and Eisentrager reveal that the Supreme
Court’s greatest institutional contribution to an international
jurisprudence of humanitarian law may be that a fuller picture—a more thoughtful and nuanced articulation and application—of the treaty provisions at issue emerges through the
combination of majority opinion and vigorous dissent.
In conclusion, the Court’s opinions in Yamashita and Eisentrager are important milestones in the Supreme Court’s adjudication of humanitarian law issues, which (1) offer a substantive contribution to humanitarian law jurisprudence, and
(2) frame the Court’s later engagements with humanitarian
law. Both the majority opinions and the dissents engage in
substantive analysis of humanitarian law instruments in the
course of passing on petitioners’ challenges. In terms of substance, the Yamashita Court’s reliance on humanitarian law
contributes to the development of international criminal law
and demonstrates the flexibility of the humanitarian law regime by identifying Yamashita’s failure to prevent atrocities as
a war crime. Eisentrager similarly provides explicit precedent
for the identification of a particular war crime.258 In terms of
procedure, Yamashita and Eisentrager exemplify the two avenues through which the Court addresses humanitarian law in
the context of armed conflict: (1) directly adjudicating claims
allegedly arising under the conventions, and (2) assessing
charges levied against detainees challenging their trial by military commission. Having considered the Court’s first engagement with Geneva law, this Part briefly reviews the Court’s reliance on the Geneva Conventions outside the context of armed
conflict. It then turns to the Court’s most recent, and extensive,
treatment of Geneva law in the “war on terror” detainee cases.
B. GENEVA LAW OUTSIDE OF ARMED CONFLICT
The Court has referred, on four occasions, to the Geneva
Conventions outside the context of armed conflict. In two of
these cases, the Court invoked the Geneva Conventions as a
tool for interpreting the Eighth Amendment bar on “cruel and
unusual” punishment.259 In holding the death penalty unconsti258. As discussed above in supra note 219, the Court also identified another violation of the law of war in dicta.
259. Such references to international law in adjudicating constitutional issues have a long and perhaps underappreciated history in Supreme Court ju-
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tutional for a petitioner who was fifteen years old at the time of
his crime, the plurality in Thompson v. Oklahoma cited Article
68 of the Fourth Geneva Convention as one of “three major
human rights treaties explicitly [to] prohibit juvenile death
penalties.”260 Dissenting from the plurality’s holding to affirm
the seventeen-year-old petitioner’s death sentence in Stanford
v. Kentucky, Justice Brennan cited the Fourth Geneva Convention for the same proposition, and further pointed out that
these treaties have been signed or ratified by the United
States.261 In a separate concurrence in Thompson, Justice
O’Connor pointed to the ratification of Article 68 of the Third
Geneva Convention as undermining the dissent’s inference of
congressional intent (in the Comprehensive Crime Control Act)
to authorize the death penalty for some fifteen year old felons.262 Justice O’Connor reasoned that Congress’s having set a
minimum age for capital punishment in other contexts—
military occupation and for certain drug crimes—suggested
that it did not intend to set a lower bar for juvenile felons.263
In the two other cases, the Court made fleeting reference to
the Geneva Conventions outside the context of armed conflict.
In Department of Employment v. United States, the Court referred to the American Red Cross’s “right and . . . obligation to
meet this Nation’s commitments under various Geneva Conventions” in determining that it is an instrumentality of the
United States for purposes of immunity from state taxation.264
In FTC v. A.P.W. Paper Co., the Court held that the paper company was not barred from using the Red Cross emblem and
name on its products.265 The Court rejected the argument that
A.P.W.’s use of the emblem and name was prohibited by certain
provisions of the Red Cross Act that reserved exclusive rights
to the American Red Cross, holding that A.P.W.’s use was lawrisprudence. See generally Sarah H. Cleveland, Our International Constitution, 31 YALE J. INT’L L. 1 (2006) (surveying exhaustively this history).
260. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 831 n.34 (1988).
261. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 390 n.10 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting), abrogated by Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
262. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 851–52 (O’Connor, J., concurring). Justice
O’Connor also pointed to federal legislation limiting application of the death
penalty for certain drug offenses to persons at least eighteen years of age. Id.
263. Id.
264. Dep’t of Emp’t v. United States, 385 U.S. 355, 359 (1966) (citing Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Wounded in Armies in the Field,
Aug. 22, 1864, 22 Stat. 940; First Geneva Convention, supra note 76; 1929
Convention, supra note 197).
265. FTC v. A.P.W. Paper Co., 328 U.S. 193, 201–02 (1946).
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ful because it antedated the Act.266 Of the 1929 Geneva Convention’s provision to “prevent the use by private persons” of
the words or symbol, the Court stated simply that it “is a matter for the executive and legislative departments.”267
The Court’s reliance on Geneva law outside the context of
armed conflict offers little substantive analysis of IHL. The
Court’s citation to Geneva law in this context, however, suggests several observations. First, references to the Third and
Fourth Geneva Conventions in Thompson and Stanford can be
read as evidence of a somewhat loose approach to international
law. Strictly speaking, the Geneva Conventions are not human
rights treaties. While the overlap between humanitarian law
and human rights law is substantial and widely remarked,268
these bodies of law are distinct and the Thompson plurality’s
citation to the Fourth Geneva Convention as one of “three major human rights treaties” is technically inaccurate.269 Second,
A.P.W. Paper is congruent with the Court’s general reticence to
treat as cognizable causes of action allegedly arising under the
Geneva Conventions—or, as demonstrated in Part II, under the
various Hague Conventions. As Paul Stephan recently noted,
one might view the Court’s statement about the 1929 Convention in Eisentrager as clarifying A.P.W. Paper’s murky treatment of the self-execution issue: the “obvious scheme” of the
1929 Convention, as the Court said in Eisentrager, was to direct responsibility for its enforcement to the political branches.
The post-war Court, in other words, was unwilling to suggest
that the Convention operated independently of its implementing statutes.270 As discussed above, this theme runs throughout
the Court’s IHL jurisprudence.

266. Id. at 200–01.
267. Id. at 203.
268. See, e.g., Cordula Droege, The Interplay Between International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law in Situations of Armed
Conflict, 40 ISRAEL L. REV. 310, 310 (2007) (discussing historical developments
leading to the increasing overlap of the two bodies of law); Meron, supra note
48, at 243–51 (describing the impact of human rights on the development of
humanitarian law and the growing convergence of the two spheres).
269. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 831 n.34 (1988); see also Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 390 n.10 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(same), abrogated by Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
270. Stephan, supra note 11, at 13–14.
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C. GENEVA LAW IN THE “WAR ON TERROR”
The Court’s most remarkable discussion of humanitarian
law has arisen in the years since September 11, 2001, specifically in the line of cases relating to detainees at Guantánamo
Bay. Of the ten cases on the merits in which at least one member of the Court references the Geneva Conventions, four arise
in the “war on terror” context.271 Notably, since its 1950 decision in Eisentrager, save the few non-substantive references
discussed above, the Court has largely ignored humanitarian
law. This gap is, perhaps, unsurprising—as is the reality that
the “particular dangers of terrorism in the modern age”272 have
confronted the Court with novel questions occasioning similarly
novel analysis. In the Guantánamo context, the Court has recognized the likelihood that “common-law courts simply may not
have confronted cases with close parallels.”273
The application of Geneva law to the war on terror has received extensive treatment elsewhere.274 A few foundational
principles that frame the Court’s analysis merit review here.
First, Article 2, common to the four 1949 Conventions, specifies
that those Conventions apply to armed conflict or occupation
between states.275 Second, as between warring states, persons of
271. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008); Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S.
674 (2008); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006), superseded by statute,
Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600; Hamdi
v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (plurality opinion).
272. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 752.
273. See id. The advent of this new age has, of course, also prompted a reevaluation of constitutional law issues: “[b]ecause our Nation’s past military
conflicts have been of limited duration, it has been possible to leave the outer
boundaries of war powers undefined.” Id. at 797–98.
274. See, e.g., M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF
TORTURE BY THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION 24 –26 (2010); David Glazier, Full
and Fair by What Measure?: Identifying the International Law Regulating Military Commission Procedure, 24 B.U. INT’L L.J. 55, 70–94 (2006); Derek Jinks,
September 11 and the Laws of War, 28 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 10–19 (2003); Jordan
Paust, War and Enemy Status After 9/11: Attacks on the Laws of War, 28
YALE J. INT’L L. 325, 328–34 (2003); Ruth Wedgwood, Al Qaeda, Terrorism,
and Military Commissions, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 328, 335–36 (2002) (discussing
the import of the Geneva Conventions for military commissions); see also Mofidi & Eckert, supra note 183, at 79–90 (discussing treatment of detainees in
the war on terror); David Weissbrodt & Amy Bergquist, Extraordinary Rendition and the Humanitarian Law of War and Occupation, 47 VA. J. INT’L L. 295,
298–317 (2006) (discussing the applicability of Geneva law to the Bush Administration’s practice of rendition).
275. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 182, art. 2 (“[T]he present
Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties,
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either state detained by the other are categorized as either
prisoners of war or civilian internees.276 The former category of
persons is protected by the Third Geneva Convention while the
latter category of persons is protected by the Fourth Geneva
Convention.277 Third, a different line of analysis is required if
the relevant conflict is not between states, i.e., is “not of an international character.”278 In each case reviewed in this section,
the Court’s analysis suffers from its failure clearly to address
these points.
1. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld
The Court first referenced Geneva law after September 11,
2001, in the 2004 case Hamdi v. Rumsfeld.279 Hamdi, a U.S. citizen, was seized in Afghanistan, transferred to the U.S. naval
base in Guantánamo Bay, and later transferred to a naval brig
in Virginia after U.S. authorities learned of his citizenship.280
The executive branch deemed Hamdi an “enemy combatant”

even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them. The Convention shall
also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of a High
Contracting Party, even if the said occupation meets with no armed resistance.”); Third Geneva Convention, supra note 182, art. 2; Second Geneva Convention, supra note 182, art. 2; First Geneva Convention, supra note 76, art. 2.
276. See INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY, IV GENEVA
CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF
WAR 51 (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1958) [hereinafter Pictet, CIVILIAN COMMENTARY]
(“Every person in enemy hands must have some status under international law:
he is either a prisoner of war and, as such, covered by the Third Convention, a
civilian covered by the Fourth Convention, or again, a member of the medical
personnel of the armed forces who is covered by the First Convention. There is
no intermediate status; nobody in enemy hands can be outside the law.”); see
also Gabor Rona, Legal Frameworks to Combat Terrorism: An Abundant Inventory of Existing Tools, 5 CHI. J. INT’L L. 499, 506 (2005) (“The Geneva Conventions are constructed so as to provide for no gaps in its coverage of enemy
soldiers and civilians. The notion that someone who fails to qualify for POW status is therefore beyond the coverage of the Geneva Conventions is incorrect.”).
277. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 182, art. 4 (describing protected persons); Third Geneva Convention, supra note 182, art. 4 (same).
278. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 182, art. 3 (“In the case of
armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of
one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound
to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions . . . .”); Third Geneva Convention, supra note 182, art. 3; Second Geneva Convention, supra note 182,
art. 3; First Geneva Convention, supra note 76, art. 3.
279. 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (plurality opinion).
280. Id. at 510.
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and held him without access to an attorney in solitary confinement.281
Among other arguments against his detention, Hamdi
raised one claim based on the Geneva Conventions.282 He
claimed that Article 5 of the Third Geneva Convention required
him to be treated as a prisoner of war until a competent tribunal determined otherwise.283 A deeply divided Supreme
Court declined to consider that question.284 Justice O’Connor,
writing for a plurality of the Court, instead determined that the
Constitution entitled Hamdi to judicial review of his detention.285
Strictly speaking, the opinion answered “only the narrow
question” of whether the September 18, 2001, Authorization for
the Use of Military Force (AUMF) authorized the detention of
“enemy combatants,” such as Hamdi.286 In answering this question, however, the plurality drew upon the law of war, including the Third Geneva Convention.287 In a broad sense, then, the
Court uses the Convention as an aid in statutory construction.
A careful parsing of the opinion against the background of the
281. Id.; see also Brief of Petitioners at 5–6, 10, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542
U.S. 507 (2004) (No. 03-6696).
282. Hamdi made the additional argument in the Fourth Circuit that his
continued detention was prohibited by the Conventions because the international armed conflict had ended with the installation of the Karzai government. See Brief of the Petitioners/Appellees at 53–54, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316
F.3d 450 (4th Cir. 2003) (No. 02-7338).
283. Id. at 38–39.
284. Id.
285. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 534 n.2 (“Because we hold that Hamdi is constitutionally entitled to the process described above, we need not address at this
time whether any treaty guarantees him similar access to a tribunal for a determination of his status.”).
286. Id. at 516. The AUMF authorized “all necessary and appropriate
force” to be used against “nations, organizations, or persons” associated with
the 9/11 attacks. Id. at 510. By narrowly tailoring the question before it, the
plurality did not reach the government’s argument that Article II provides the
executive plenary detention authority. Id. at 517. Nor do any of the four opinions define “enemy combatant.” Rather, the plurality accepts, for the purpose
of the case, the government’s definition as one who was “part of or supporting
forces hostile to the United States or coalition partners in Afghanistan and
who engaged in an armed conflict against the United States there.” Id. at 516
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
287. Id. at 518. The plurality finds the language of the AUMF to represent
“explicit congressional authorization” for the detention of enemy combatants.
Id. at 519 (“[I]t is of no moment that the AUMF does not use specific language
of detention. . . . [I]n permitting the use of ‘necessary and appropriate force,’
Congress has clearly and unmistakably authorized detention in the narrow
circumstances considered here.”).
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Court’s prior treatment of humanitarian law, however, reveals
that the plurality draws on humanitarian law in four different
ways.
a. Hamdi’s Use of Humanitarian Law
First, through reliance on its precedent, the Court interpreted the customary law of war to emphasize the centrality of
detention to waging war.288 Critical to the plurality’s conclusion
that the AUMF authorized Hamdi’s detention was its intermediate finding that detention is a “fundamental incident of waging war.”289 This proposition allowed the plurality to conclude
that detention was therefore necessarily contemplated in the
“all necessary and appropriate force” language of the AUMF.290
The plurality quoted Ex parte Quirin in noting that “universal
agreement and practice” sanction detention of enemy belligerents during war,291 and went on to frame the practice of wartime detention as a means to prevent belligerents from returning to the battlefield.292 In short, the Court reaffirmed and
emphasized its assessment in Quirin as to the content of the
customary law of war.
Second, the plurality invoked the law of war as persuasive
authority to support its conclusion that Hamdi’s citizen status
did not preclude his detention.293 The plurality found no meaningful distinction between Hamdi and the citizen-detainee in
Quirin294 and cited for support the Lieber Code, which it understood to “contemplate[] . . . that ‘captured rebels’ would be
288. Id.
289. Id. at 518–19.
290. Id. Concurring in the judgment, Justice Souter flatly rejected this
claim, arguing that the Non-Detention Act required “clear congressional authorization before any citizen can be placed in a cell,” which the vague language
of the AUMF cannot be read to provide. Id. at 543, 547 (Souter, J., concurring).
291. Id. at 518–19 (plurality opinion).
292. The Court cited the following three authorities for the proposition that
the purpose of wartime detention is to incapacitate the detainee, not to serve a
punitive function: In re Territo, 156 F.2d 142, 145 (9th Cir. 1946); WILLIAM
WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 788 (rev. 2d ed. 1920); Yasmin
Naqvi, Doubtful Prisoner-of-War Status, 84 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 571, 572
(2002) (quoting decision of Nuremburg Military Tribunal, reprinted in 41 AM.
J. INT’L L. 172, 229 (1947)). Justice Scalia faulted the plurality’s application of
this principle to Hamdi because these sources do not speak to the detention of
U.S. citizens. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 574 n.5 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
293. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 519 (plurality opinion).
294. Id. The plurality found it of no moment that Quirin petitioner Haupt
was detained for the purpose of war crimes prosecution and Hamdi was detained solely to prevent his return to the battlefield. Id.
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treated ‘as prisoners of war.’”295 The inference, of course, is that
the Lieber Code, the first modern codification of the law of war,
offered precedent for the wartime detention of U.S. citizens.
Third, the plurality cited the Third Geneva Convention in
assessing Hamdi’s claim that his detention was “indefinite.”296
In contrast to the Yamashita Court’s analysis of the 1929 Convention, the plurality offered little textual analysis of the 1949
Convention. Rather, it simply recognized the “clearly established principle of the law of war that detention may last no
longer than active hostilities”297 and “agree[d] that indefinite
detention for the purpose of interrogation is not authorized.”298
The Court found, however, that Hamdi’s detention was not of
this kind. “Longstanding law-of-war principles” guided the
Court to construe the AUMF to authorize detention “for the duration of the relevant conflict,” which the plurality defined as
the period “[U.S.] troops are still involved in active combat in
Afghanistan.”299
The plurality hedged on this point, however, pointing out
that its understanding that detention is permitted “for the duration of the relevant conflict” may change if the war on terrorism presents a situation not envisioned during the development
of the laws of war.300 The plurality thus explicitly tethered its
pronouncement on the permissibility of Hamdi’s detention to
the current state of the law of war.301
Fourth, the plurality mentioned the Third Geneva Convention in elucidating the kind of process required by the Constitution for citizen-detainees in Hamdi’s position.302 Though the
295. Id.
296. Id. at 519–20. Specifically, the plurality responded to the suggestion
that the AUMF does not authorize indefinite detention. Id.
297. Id. at 520 (employing the “see” cite to the Third Geneva Convention,
supra note 182, and the “see also” cite to the Second Hague Convention of
1899, supra note 57, the Fourth Hague Convention, supra note 33, and the
1929 Geneva Convention, supra note 197).
298. Id. at 521.
299. Id.
300. Id. (“If the practical circumstances of a given conflict are entirely unlike those of the conflicts that informed the development of the law of war,
that understanding may unravel.”).
301. Two years later Hamdan argued that his detention fell into precisely
this category. See Brief for Petitioner at 34, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S.
557 (2006) (No. 05-184) [hereinafter Hamdan Petitioner’s Brief ] (quoting
Hamdi, 542 U.S. 507, and arguing that “this case presents the question Hamdi left open”).
302. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 538.
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plurality upheld Hamdi’s detention, it found that the process
proposed by the government was constitutionally inadequate,303
and ultimately held that “a citizen-detainee seeking to challenge his classification as an enemy combatant must receive
notice of the factual basis for his classification, and a fair opportunity to rebut the Government’s factual assertions before a
neutral decisionmaker.”304 After elucidating the basic process
implicit in this formulation,305 the Court pointed out that these
standards “could be met by an appropriately authorized and
properly constituted military tribunal.”306 The plurality suggested that adequate process was already employed under current military regulations for detainees asserting prisoner of
war status under the Third Geneva Convention.307
In sum, the plurality employed humanitarian law (1)
through reliance on and elaboration of precedent interpreting
the customary laws of war, (2) as persuasive authority to support its reading of Quirin that there is no bar on the detention
of U.S. citizens, (3) as a tool of statutory construction in assessing Hamdi’s claim that the AUMF does not authorize indefinite
detention, and (4) to illustrate a context in which constitutionally adequate procedures to challenge one’s detention exist.
b. The Court’s Reluctance to Engage Holistically the Corpus of
IHL
The Hamdi decision is complex and ambiguous, as evidenced by the Court’s issuance of no fewer than four opinions,
303. Id. at 532. The government had urged that the factual statements
presented in a sole Defense Department declaration constituted sufficient factfinding in part because Hamdi’s seizure took place in a combat zone. Id. at
526–28. The plurality recognized both Hamdi’s liberty interest and the “weighty and sensitive governmental interests” at stake and balanced the competing
interests under the due process balancing test elucidated in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 528–32.
304. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 533.
305. While the detainee must have an opportunity to be heard, “proceedings may be tailored to alleviate their uncommon potential to burden the Executive at a time of ongoing military conflict,” which may entail admission of
hearsay and a presumption in favor of the government’s evidence. Id. The plurality envisioned a burden-shifting scheme in which the government must first
proffer “credible evidence,” which the alleged combatant detainee would then
have an opportunity to rebut. Id. at 533–34.
306. Id. at 538.
307. These regulations make available military tribunals to render detainee-status determinations. Id. (citation omitted). This reference by the plurality
is critical to Justice Roberts’s invocation of the Geneva Convention in his
Boumediene dissent. See infra Part III.C.3.
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none of which garnered a majority. The complexities of humanitarian law are at the center of the plurality opinion’s lack of
clarity. As one commentator has pointed out, much confusion
stems from the Court’s “reluctance to grapple directly with the
contours of international humanitarian law and from its failure
to articulate clearly the relationship between that body of law
and U.S. law.”308 The central problem with the plurality opinion’s approach is its selective reliance on humanitarian law
principles without placing such concepts in the broader context
of this body of law. The consequence is a jurisprudential confusion of concepts.
The plurality alternatively did not recognize its reliance on
humanitarian law and purported to rely on humanitarian law
principles, but applied them without the necessary context. As
one commentator argues, for example, the Court’s recognition
of the concept of “enemy combatant” demonstrated an unremarked reliance on humanitarian law.309 While it may be more
precisely stated that the plurality was relying on the Court’s
interpretation of humanitarian law in Quirin—recall that the
terms “enemy combatant” and “unlawful belligerent” do not appear in the Conventions; rather, the Quirin Court used humanitarian law to infer the existence of such a category310—the
point remains that the Hamdi plurality did not clearly articulate its use of humanitarian law.
Similarly, the plurality’s reliance on the Third Geneva
Convention as well as various provisions of Hague law for the
principle that “detention may last no longer than active hostilities” is problematic—though here the analysis is more incomplete than inaccurate.311 The plurality failed to consider explicitly two issues critical to the invocation of the Third Geneva
Convention: whether the “relevant conflict” was the war between the United States and Afghanistan or between the Unit308. Jenny S. Martinez, International Decision: Availability of U.S. Court
to Review Decision to Hold U.S. Citizen as Enemy Combatant—Executive Power in War on Terror, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 782, 785 (2004).
309. See id. at 785–86. One might counter that the plurality merely
adopted the term as descriptive of Hamdi for the purposes of the case, and
thus did not “import” any substantive concepts of humanitarian law.
310. See supra Part II.A.
311. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 520. Depending on the nature of the underlying
armed conflict, the relevant IHL provisions may offer only prohibitions, not affirmative grants of detention authority. See Cerone, supra note 43, at 410–12;
Martinez, supra note 308, at 786. The cited provision actually states: “Prisoners of war shall be released and repatriated without delay after the cessation
of active hostilities.” Third Geneva Convention, supra note 182, art. 118.
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ed States and al Qaeda, and whether Hamdi was a civilian or a
combatant.
As noted above, all detainees captured during an international armed conflict are either prisoners of war or civilian detainees, while a separate, more limited, set of rules applies to
conflicts “not of an international character.” The Court, however, did not clarify the “relevant conflict.” If, on the one hand,
the relevant conflict was the U.S.-Afghanistan war, Article 2
was plainly satisfied because that conflict arose “between two
or more of the High Contracting Parties.”312 On this interpretation, Hamdi’s Article 5 argument should have prevailed, assuming the Geneva Conventions to be self-executing.313 On the
other hand, if the relevant conflict was the amorphous “war on
terrorism,” or more specifically, the transnational armed conflict between the United States and al Qaeda, the Article 2 criteria may not have been met, rendering the provision cited by
the plurality inapplicable in the first instance.314 Moreover, the
plurality’s silence as to Hamdi’s claim of prisoner of war status
also raises a question of whether it properly invoked the Third
Geneva Convention. If Hamdi in fact was not a belligerent, as
he claimed, then the relevant instruments were the Fourth Geneva Convention and Additional Protocol I, though again this
depends on the nature of the underlying conflict.315 The Court’s

312. Third Geneva Convention, supra note 182, art. 2. Still, the international armed conflict arguably ended with the installation of the Karzai government, thus requiring a separate legal basis for the continued applicability
of the full provisions of the Convention. See Alec Walen & Ingo Venzke, Unconstitutional Detention of Nonresident Aliens: Revisiting the Supreme Court’s
Treatment of the Law of War in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 67 HEIDELBERG J. INT’L L.
843, 851 (2007); Martinez, supra note 308, at 786–88 (citing International
Humanitarian Law and Terrorism: Questions and Answers, INT’L COMMITTEE
RED CROSS (May 5, 2004), available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/
documents/faq/terrorism-faq-050504.htm).
313. Whether the Geneva Conventions are self-executing is a point of contention in the lower courts that the Supreme Court has so far declined to resolve. Compare United States v. Khadr, 717 F. Supp. 2d 1215, 1220 n.4 (Ct.
Mil. Comm’n Rev. 2007) (noting that the Geneva Conventions are “generally
viewed as self-executing treaties”), and United States v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp.
2d 541, 553 n.20 (E.D. Va. 2002) (same), with Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d
450, 468 (4th Cir. 2003) (viewing the Geneva Conventions as non-selfexecuting), rev’d on other grounds, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
314. See Walen & Venzke, supra note 312, at 850–52 (discussing the
Court’s confusion of the “war on terror” with the war in Afghanistan).
315. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, adopted
June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Additional Protocol I]; Fourth Ge-
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decision not to address these issues may have been dispositive
to the case.316
Ingrid Wuerth offers several further criticisms of the
Hamdi plurality’s use of humanitarian law.317 First, she argues
that Quirin and the other sources upon which the plurality relied318 offer only weak support for the conclusion that detention
is a “fundamental incident” of war.319 The gist of this criticism
is that the plurality misconstrued humanitarian law in interpreting the scope of the AUMF’s detention authority.320 Second,
Wuerth argues that the plurality asked and answered the
wrong question in concluding that the law of war provides “no
bar” to the detention of U.S. citizens.321 In terms of the AUMF,
she argues, this approach would broaden the scope of authorization to include everything not specifically prohibited by the
law of war, as opposed to authorizing only conduct “fundamental” to waging war.322 Third, Wuerth recognizes that the plurality ignored the domestic status of the Geneva Conventions: it
did not point out that the United States is a party to the treaties, consider whether the Conventions are self-executing, or

neva Convention, supra note 182, art. 78; see also Walen & Venzke, supra note
312, at 854 –57.
316. See Martinez, supra note 308, at 786–88 (“Even if the U.S. Congress,
in enacting the AUMF, intended to authorize implicitly the detention of individuals to the extent customary under the laws of war, that authority would
have ended with the termination of the international armed conflict . . . .”).
Martinez goes on to characterize the plurality’s approach as “embark[ing] on a
questionable path toward creating its own, new constitutional common law of
war, ungrounded either in international humanitarian law or in any specific
legislation enacted by the U.S. Congress.” Id.
317. See Ingrid Brunk Wuerth, Authorizations for the Use of Force, International Law, and the Charming Betsy Canon, 46 B.C. L. REV. 293, 307–19
(2005) (analyzing the use of international humanitarian law in the Hamdi
plurality opinion).
318. See supra notes 289–92 and accompanying text.
319. See Wuerth, supra note 317, at 309–16 (quoting Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,
542 U.S. 507, 519 (2004) (plurality opinion)).
320. See id. at 313–14 (“It is one thing to reason that Congress authorized
the President to detain in ways affirmatively sanctioned and regulated (and
thus also limited) by the law of war; it is quite another to rely on some law-ofwar authorities to support the claim of congressional authorization for a detention that purportedly falls outside the scope of those authorities.”).
321. See id. at 316–18 (quoting Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 519).
322. See id. at 317–18 (noting that the absence of a prohibition on such detention in the law of war and the purposes of detention were the “only evidence the plurality cited to support reading the AUMF to include” the detention of U.S. citizens).
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suggest whether either feature is relevant in using humanitarian law to interpret the AUMF.323
Justice Souter offered the more substantial analysis of
humanitarian law in a separate opinion, in which he concurred
in the judgment.324 He took a different view of Hamdi’s Geneva
claims, arguing that the Bush Administration did not act in accordance with the Geneva Conventions because it failed to treat
Hamdi as a prisoner of war.325 Citing Article 4 of the Third Geneva Convention, Justice Souter stated that Hamdi was “presumably” a Taliban detainee because “he was taken bearing
arms on the Taliban side of a field of battle in Afghanistan” and
would therefore “seem to qualify for treatment as a prisoner of
war under the Third Geneva Convention.”326 Citing Article 5 of
the Convention, Justice Souter noted that to the extent there
was doubt about Hamdi’s status, he was to be presumptively
treated as a prisoner of war until a competent tribunal determined otherwise.327 Yet Justice Souter remained circumspect in
this analysis, openly admitting that “[w]hether, or to what degree, the Government is in fact violating the Geneva Convention and is thus acting outside the customary usages of war are
not matters I can resolve at this point.”328 Justice Souter
rightly pointed to the presumption of prisoner-of-war status
323. See id. at 318–19.
324. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 548–51 (Souter, J., concurring). Justice Souter
joined the plurality to conclude that on remand Hamdi should have a meaningful opportunity to prove that he is not an enemy combatant. See id. at 553.
In his concurrence, however, Justice Souter argued that the AUMF did not authorize Hamdi’s detention and disclaimed speaking to the specifics of the plurality’s due process analysis. See id. at 553–54 (“I do not mean to imply
agreement that the Government could claim an evidentiary presumption casting the burden of rebuttal on Hamdi, or that an opportunity to litigate before a
military tribunal might obviate or truncate enquiry by a court on habeas procedural components suggested by the plurality.” (citations omitted)).
325. See id. at 549 (arguing that the Administration’s official position that
Hamdi was not “entitled to prisoner of war status” is “at odds with its claim
here to be acting in accordance with customary law of war”). But see Curtis A.
Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War on
Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2048, 2095–96 (2005) (arguing that Justice Souter confused the “distinction between international law rules that are conditions
precedent for the exercise of authorized powers, and those that are not,” and
that if Hamdi was mistakenly classified as an unlawful combatant as opposed
to a prisoner of war, then “that would simply mean that Hamdi’s treatment
was not statutorily authorized, not that Hamdi’s detention was unauthorized”).
326. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 549 (citing Third Geneva Convention, supra note
182, art. 4).
327. See id. at 549–50.
328. Id. at 551.
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under Article 5 of the Third Geneva Convention. In light of this
analysis, his circumspection about the government’s failure to
comply with the “customary law of war” is puzzling.
In dissent, Justice Scalia argued that the “laws and usages
of war” were inapplicable to Hamdi’s detention because he is a
U.S. citizen.329 He called into question the plurality’s determination that detention is a “fundamental incident of waging
war,” and thus its conclusion that the broad language of the
AUMF constituted congressional authorization for Hamdi’s detention.330 The dispositive issue for Justice Scalia was Hamdi’s
status as a U.S. citizen.331 He therefore skirted the issue of
humanitarian law altogether; for him, the key inquiry was not
what the Geneva Conventions guaranteed Hamdi, but what the
Constitution guaranteed him.332 Ultimately, in Justice Scalia’s
view, absent a formal suspension of the writ of habeas corpus,
Hamdi should have been charged or released.333
Justice Thomas, in a separate dissent, proffered the most
cryptic reference to humanitarian law. He agreed with the plurality’s conclusion that the AUMF represented congressional
authorization for Hamdi’s detention, but argued that the plurality unduly restricted this authority by limiting it to periods
of active combat.334 “[T]he power to detain,” Justice Thomas argued, “does not end with the cessation of formal hostilities.”335
He thus rejected the applicability of the Third Geneva Convention altogether, stating flatly, “I do not believe that we may diminish the Federal Government’s war powers by reference to a
treaty and certainly not to a treaty that does not apply.”336
Justice Thomas did not explain why the Third Convention
does not apply. Presumably, he adopted the Fourth Circuit’s

329. See id. at 567–68 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The Government justifies
imprisonment of Hamdi on principles of the law of war and admits that, absent the war, it would have no such authority. But if the law of war cannot be
applied to citizens where courts are open, then Hamdi’s imprisonment without
criminal trial is no less unlawful than Milligan’s trial by military tribunal.”).
330. See id. at 574 n.5.
331. See supra note 329.
332. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 574 n.5 (“That captivity may be consistent
with the principles of international law does not prove that it also complies
with the restrictions that the Constitution places on the American Government’s treatment of its own citizens.”).
333. See id. at 572.
334. See id. at 587–88 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
335. Id. at 588.
336. See id.
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conclusion that the Convention is not self-executing.337 A later
footnote offered only the following clarification: “Hamdi’s detention comports with the laws of war, including the Third Geneva
Convention.”338 Justice Thomas also seemed to claim support
for his expansive view of inherent executive wartime detention
authority in the law of war.339
In sum, the dissenting Justices’ treatment of humanitarian
law is as splintered as the plurality’s. Justice Scalia couched
his disagreement in terms of the plurality’s misreading of its
precedent and other authorities by not giving sufficient weight
to the citizen/alien distinction.340 He did not explicitly engage
the majority’s reliance on Quirin for the proposition that detention as such is “a fundamental incident of war.”341 Rather, Justice Scalia disagreed with the inference that such a proposition
equally authorized detention for aliens and U.S. citizens
alike.342 Justice Scalia’s disagreement, therefore, does not seem
to be with the majority’s emphasis on the centrality of detention to the law of war. Meanwhile, as evidenced by his cursory
reliance on the government’s brief for the proposition that
Hamdi’s detention “comports with . . . the Third Geneva Convention,”343 Justice Thomas was plainly uninterested in the
prospect that the Geneva Conventions might play any role in
the Court’s decision.

337. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 468–69 (4th Cir. 2003), judgment vacated, 542 U.S. 507 (2004). In a remarkable dissent from the Court’s
denial of certiorari in Noriega v. Pastrana, Justice Thomas provided further
clues as to how he would dispose of Geneva claims. 130 S. Ct. 1002, 1008–09
(2010) (suggesting that addressing the constitutionality of the Military Commissions Act’s proscription on detainees’ invocation of the Geneva Conventions
would allow the Court to reach the question of whether the conventions are
self-executing and judicially enforceable).
338. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 597 n.6 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Brief for
Respondents at 22–24, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (No. 03-6696)).
339. See id. at 597–98 (arguing that the difficulty in distinguishing between military necessity and expediency “does not serve to distinguish this
case because it is also consistent with the laws of war to detain enemy combatants exactly as the Government has detained Hamdi. This, in fact, bolsters my
argument [above] to the extent that the laws of war show that the power to
detain is part of a sovereign’s war powers.”).
340. See id. at 569–72 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
341. See id. at 519 (plurality opinion) (citing Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1,
30–31 (1942)); id. at 548–49 (Souter, J., concurring) (citing Ex parte Quirin,
317 U.S. 1 (1942)).
342. See id. at 575 n.5 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
343. See supra note 338 and accompanying text.
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The common thread underlying the Court’s various opinions is that none undertakes a comprehensive analysis of the
humanitarian law issues at stake. The opinions do not identify
the relevant conflict, which in turn triggers the applicability of
different provisions of the Conventions. Nor do they assess
Hamdi’s status under the law of war. The Court’s treatment of
IHL in Hamdi thus suggests that the Court is institutionally
ill-equipped for—and some members of the Court patently uninterested in—systematically engaging the Geneva Conventions.
2. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld
The Court’s most remarkable analysis of humanitarian law
appears in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.344 Commentators have
pointed to Hamdan as a landmark from the day it was handed
down on June 29, 2006.345 In the context of this Article, however, while noteworthy for its humanitarian law analysis, the decision was not as radical a procedural departure from the
Court’s historical reticence to consider Geneva law as might
first appear. Justice Stevens’s majority opinion made clear that
the Court relied on the Geneva Conventions only to the extent
the UCMJ incorporated the law of war.346 Still, quite apart
from the question of judicial enforceability, the decision is remarkable for its novel and controversial interpretation of the
Geneva Conventions.347
344. 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
345. See, e.g., Walter Dellinger, A Supreme Court Conversation: The Most
Important Decision on Presidential Power. Ever., SLATE (June 29, 2006, 5:50
PM), http://www.slate.com/id/2144476/entry/2144825.
346. See infra notes 374 –76 and accompanying text. The legislative response to the Hamdan decision, however, offers a strong argument in favor of
judicial enforceability. See Carlos Manuel Vázquez, The Military Commissions
Act, the Geneva Conventions, and the Courts: A Critical Guide, 101 AM. J.
INT’L L. 73, 76 n.30 (2007) (noting that the provisions of the Military Commissions Act “curtail[ing] judicial enforcement of the Geneva Conventions would
be superfluous” if the Conventions were not judicially enforceable). For criticism of the Military Commissions Act in light of the Geneva Conventions, see
James G. Stewart, The Military Commissions Act’s Inconsistency with the Geneva Conventions: An Overview, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 26 (2007). See also Jennifer Trahan, Military Commission Trials at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba: Do They
Satisfy International and Constitutional Law?, 30 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 780,
820–21 (2007) (finding difficulty in construing the Military Commission Act
provisions not to violate Common Article 3).
347. The Hamdan decision is long and complex. This Article addresses
solely its engagement with humanitarian law. For a brief, yet comprehensive,
summary of the decision, see Gregory E. Maggs, Symposium on the New Face
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Hamdan was captured on the battlefield in Afghanistan
during hostilities between the United States and the Taliban in
November 2001, transported to Guantánamo Bay in June 2002,
and charged in mid-2004 with one count of “conspiracy to commit . . . offenses triable by military commission.”348 Hamdan’s
January 2006 habeas petition alleged that the military commission convened to try him was unlawful because it violated
the Third Geneva Convention.349 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari after a panel of the D.C. Circuit concluded that the
Geneva Conventions are not judicially enforceable, and in any
event, that Hamdan was not entitled to their protections.350
The Court, by marked contrast, held that Common Article 3
applied to the military commission convened to try Hamdan,
and that the commission was unlawful because it did not comply with its provisions.351
That the Court reached the merits is itself remarkable in
light of several jurisdictional hurdles352 and a history of judicial
deference to the executive on questions of national security.353
Indeed, the Court may well have declined to accept certiorari
following the D.C. Circuit’s approval of the government’s posiof Armed Conflict: Enemy Combatants After Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 75 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 971, 976–83 (2007).
348. See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 566 (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).
349. See Hamdan Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 301, at 36–50.
350. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33, 38–42 (D.C. Cir. 2005), rev’d, 548
U.S. 557 (2006). The panel based its opinion almost entirely on Justice Jackson’s footnote in Eisentrager, described in supra Part I, which stated that “responsibility for observance and enforcement of [the 1929 Geneva Convention]
is upon the political and military authorities.” See id. at 39 (quoting Johnson
v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 789 n.14 (1950)).
351. See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 625–35.
352. The Court rejected the government’s motion to dismiss on the ground
that the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (DTA), Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat.
2738, deprived the Court of jurisdiction. See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 572–84. The
Court also rejected the applicability of the common-law rule that civilian
courts should await final outcome of a military proceeding before passing on
the legitimacy of the tribunal. See id. at 584 –90.
353. See, e.g., Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 433–34, 451 (2004) (failing
to consider whether the President has authority to detain a U.S. citizen as an
“enemy combatant” while reversing and remanding on jurisdictional grounds).
But see Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 535–37 (2004) (plurality opinion)
(holding that “due process demands some system for a citizen-detainee to refute his classification” as such); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 485 (2004)
(“[F]ederal courts have jurisdiction to determine the legality of the Executive’s
potentially indefinite detention of [Guantanamo Bay detainees] who claim to
be wholly innocent of wrongdoing.”).
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tion.354 Instead, the Court engaged humanitarian law in two
ways: (1) by holding that the offense with which Hamdan was
charged did not constitute a violation of the law of war, and (2)
by holding that the military commission violated Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. The following analyzes each
determination in turn.
a. Probing Humanitarian Law to Define “Conspiracy”
In the absence of congressional authorization for the specific commission convened to try Hamdan, the Court looked to
humanitarian law to define the charge levied against him.355
Clarifying its prior pronouncements about the jurisdiction of
military commissions, the Court distinguished between three
types of commissions.356 The jurisdiction of Hamdan’s commission, once established as an “incident to the conduct of war,”
was limited to offenses against the law of war.357 As in Quirin,
Yamashita, and Eisentrager, then, the Court had to determine
whether the charge against Hamdan stated a violation of the
law of war.358
Justice Stevens wrote for a plurality of the Court on the
question of whether the charge was triable by military commission;359 having concluded that the commission violated Common Article 3, Justice Kennedy did not reach the issue.360
Hamdan was charged with conspiracy to commit offenses in354. See Peter J. Spiro, International Decisions: Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 100
AM. J. INT’L L. 888, 892–93 (2006) (describing the Court’s “institutional fortitude” in light of prior judicial practice).
355. See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 594 –95 (holding that the UCMJ, AUMF,
and DTA “at most” confer a general authority on the President to convene military tribunals “where justified under the ‘Constitution and laws,’ including
the law of war” (citing the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005,
§ 1005(e)(3)(D)(ii))).
356. The three types of military commissions are identified as (1) those
“substituted for civilian courts . . . where martial law has been declared,” see
id. at 595 (plurality opinion); (2) those established “as part of a temporary military government over occupied” territory in the absence of civilian government, see id. at 595–96 (quoting Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 314
(1946)); and (3) those established as an “incident to the conduct of war” as
needed “to seize and subject to disciplinary measures those enemies who in
their attempt to thwart or impede our military effort have violated the law of
war,” see id. at 596 (quoting Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 28–29 (1942)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
357. See id. at 596–97.
358. See id. at 597.
359. See id. at 595–613.
360. See id. at 653–55 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part).
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cluding attacking civilians and terrorism.361 The alleged conspiracy extended from 1996 to November 2001 and included
four overt acts ascribed to Hamdan, none of which in itself constituted a law-of-war violation.362 To determine whether “conspiracy” constituted a violation of the law of war, the plurality
drew on both domestic and international sources.363 It relied,
for example, on Winthrop’s treatise to conclude that the offense
alleged must have been committed in a theater of war and during the relevant conflict, problems for the conspiracy charge as
no overt act was alleged to have occurred after September 11,
2001.364 The plurality also observed that the charge of conspiracy does not appear in the Geneva or Hague Conventions, while
the Third Geneva Convention does extend liability for other
acts.365 After reviewing these sources, Justice Stevens concluded that the admittedly high threshold366 for defining the
charge as an offense against the law of war was not met, and
therefore that the commission “lack[ed] authority to try Hamdan.”367
b. Finding a Violation of Common Article 3
The Court then determined that the procedures of Hamdan’s commission violated Common Article 3 of the Conventions. Notwithstanding the procedural caveat described above,
361. The charging document stated that Hamdan “willfully and knowingly
joined an enterprise of persons who shared a common criminal purpose and
conspired and agreed with [named members of al Qaeda] to commit the following offenses triable by military commission: attacking civilians; attacking civilian objects; murder by an unprivileged belligerent; and terrorism.” Id. at 569–
70 (majority opinion) (citation omitted).
362. See id. at 570 (describing the acts and time frame); id. at 600 (“None
of the overt acts that Hamdan is alleged to have committed violates the law
of war.”).
363. The Court drew heavily from Quirin, which it characterized as the
“high-water mark of military power to try enemy combatants for war crimes,”
id. at 597, and later pointed to as support for Hamdan’s argument that conspiracy is not a violation of the law of war because it emphasized completed
acts, unlike Hamdan’s nascent efforts, id. at 606–07.
364. See id. at 597–600.
365. See id. at 603–04 & n.36 (noting liability “for substantive war crimes
to those who ‘orde[r]’ their commission” (citing Third Geneva Convention, supra note 182, art. 129)). The plurality also pointed out that the Nuremberg
Tribunal refused to recognize conspiracy as a violation of the law of war. See
id. at 610.
366. See id. at 603 (pointing out that the offense in Quirin was recognized
as such by “universal agreement and practice” though admitting that the bar
was “arguably” lower in Yamashita—a rather striking understatement).
367. See id. at 611–12.
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this holding is indeed a landmark in the Court’s humanitarian
law jurisprudence. It represents the only time in its history
that the Court clearly and explicitly has found any provision of
Geneva law to apply to a petitioner—even if via its incorporation by statute, the UCMJ.368 It also represents the Court’s first
and only reference to Common Article 3 of the 1949 Conventions.
The Court reviewed the D.C. Circuit’s bases for dismissing
Hamdan’s Geneva claims one by one.369 First, it reviewed the
determination that the Geneva Conventions are not judicially
enforceable.370 Its analysis deftly sidestepped the question of
whether the Conventions are self-executing.371 Recognizing the
circuit court’s heavy reliance on certain language in Eisentrager to conclude that “the 1949 Geneva Convention does not confer upon Hamdan a right to enforce its provisions in court,”372
the Court stated that this language is “[b]uried in a footnote of
the opinion” and “[w]hatever else might be said about the Eisentrager footnote, it does not control this case.”373
Still, the Court bent over backward to harmonize the Eisentrager footnote with its holding as to the applicability of
Common Article 3, emphasizing that it was not addressing the
rights conferred on Hamdan by the Geneva Conventions.374
Rather, the law of war’s incorporation into the UCMJ mandated compliance with the Geneva Conventions quite apart
368. See id. at 627–28 (noting that Article 21 of the UCMJ covers compliance
with the law of war, including the Geneva Conventions).
369. In addition to the two bases discussed below, the D.C. Circuit also
suggested that even if Hamdan is entitled to the protections of the Geneva
Conventions, precedent demanded abstention from the question of whether
the military commission violated Article 3 of the Third Geneva Convention.
See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33, 42 (D.C. Cir. 2005), rev’d, 548 U.S. 557.
The Supreme Court clarified the circuit court’s conflation of these “two distinct
inquiries” in rejecting its Article 3 argument on the merits. See Hamdan, 548
U.S. at 589 n.20.
370. See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 626–28.
371. See id. (focusing on the fact that the Geneva Conventions are “part of
the law of war” rather than considering whether the Conventions are selfexecuting).
372. See id. at 627 (quoting Hamdan, 415 F.3d at 40). For a summary of
the Eisentrager footnote, see supra notes 205–06 and accompanying text.
373. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 627.
374. See id. at 627–28 (“We may assume that ‘the obvious scheme’ of the
1949 Conventions is identical in all relevant respects to that of the 1929 Geneva Convention, and even that that scheme would, absent some other provision
of law, preclude Hamdan’s invocation of the Convention’s provisions as an independent source of law binding the Government’s actions and furnishing petitioner with any enforceable right.”).
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from whatever rights they may or may not confer upon Hamdan.375 In short, regardless of the Convention’s effect were it
invoked as an independent source of rights, the dispositive factor was its status as a component of the law of war, with which
Article 21 of the UCMJ mandated compliance.376 The Court
thus evaded the question of whether the Convention is selfexecuting.377 Therefore, while it went on to pronounce Article 3
applicable to Hamdan, the Court arguably left the nettlesome
Eisentrager footnote unscathed.378
Adding another layer of complexity to its (non)treatment of
the self-executing treaty issue, the Court cited a bevy of contrary authorities, which suggested (1) that the Court should not
follow Eisentrager to “assume” that the “obvious scheme” of the
1929 Conventions was identical to that of the 1949 Conventions,379 and (2) that Hamdan was not, in fact, “preclude[d]”
from invoking the Conventions “as an independent source of
law binding the Government’s actions”380—i.e., that the Conventions did furnish him with enforceable rights.381 Unsurpri375. See id. at 628 (“For regardless of the nature of the rights conferred on
Hamdan, they are, as the Government does not dispute, part of the law of war.
And compliance with the law of war is the condition upon which the authority
set forth in Article 21 is granted.” (internal citations omitted)); see also id. at
642 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part) (“There should be no doubt . . . that
Common Article 3 is part of the law of war . . . .”).
376. See id. at 627–28.
377. See Aya Gruber, Who’s Afraid of Geneva Law?, 39 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1017,
1041–84 (2007) (criticizing the Court’s failure to address the self-executing
treaty issue as going beyond mere judicial temperance and situating this approach in a broader context of jurisprudential and political isolationism).
378. But see id. at 1039–40 (describing the argument that the Court’s interpretation of the UCMJ implied that the Geneva Conventions are selfexecuting (citing Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 716–17)).
379. See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 627 n.57 (majority opinion) (employing the
“[b]ut see, e.g.” signal to reference the authoritative commentaries to the Third
and Fourth Geneva Conventions, which state respectively that “[i]t was not
. . . until the Conventions of 1949 . . . that the existence of ‘rights’ conferred on
prisoners of war was affirmed,” Pictet, POW COMMENTARY, supra note 57, at
91, and that the 1949 Conventions were written “first and foremost to protect
individuals, and not to serve State interests,” Pictet, CIVILIAN COMMENTARY,
supra note 276, at 21).
380. See id. at 627–28.
381. See INT’L COMMENTARY OF THE RED CROSS, I GENEVA CONVENTION
FOR THE AMELIORATION OF THE CONDITION OF THE WOUNDED AND SICK IN
ARMED FORCES IN THE FIELD (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1952) [hereinafter Pictet,
FIELD COMMENTARY]; Hamdan, 542 U.S. at 628 n.58 (employing the “[b]ut see
generally” signal to refer to a brief and commentaries supporting the proposition that Hamdan was furnished enforceable rights under the Geneva Conventions) (citing Brief for Louis Henkin et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Peti-
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singly, the Court was unwilling to denounce the Eisentrager
footnote or to clarify the domestic status of the 1949 Conventions notwithstanding this profusion of contrary authority.
Second, the Court addressed the D.C. Circuit’s holding that
even if Hamdan were able to invoke the Geneva Conventions,
he would not be entitled to their protections because he was
captured in the war with al Qaeda—a conflict that “evades [the
Conventions’] reach” because al Qaeda is not a “high contracting party,” as required by Article 2.382 The Court sidestepped
this argument entirely: “We need not decide the merits of this
argument because there is at least one provision of the Geneva
Conventions that applies here even if the relevant conflict is
not one between signatories.”383 That provision is Common Article 3, which applies to conflicts “not of an international chartioner, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 507 (2006) (No. 05-184); Pictet, POW
COMMENTARY, supra note 57; Pictet, CIVILIAN COMMENTARY, supra note 276).
The Court particularly highlighted language from the official commentary to
the First Geneva Convention stating that “[i]t should be possible in States
which are parties to the Convention . . . for the rules of the Convention . . . to
be evoked before an appropriate national court by the protected person who
has suffered the violation.” Id. (quoting Pictet, CIVILIAN COMMENTARY, supra
note 277, at 84).
382. See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 628–29 (citing Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415
F.3d 33, 41–42 (D.C. Cir. 2005)). Arguing that the war with al Qaeda was separate from the war with the Taliban, the Bush Administration contended that
because Article 2 makes applicable the full protections of the Conventions only
to “all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more High Contracting parties,” and because al Qaeda is not a
high contracting party, the full protections of the Geneva Conventions did not
apply. See Hamdan Government Brief, supra note 206, at 38–39 (quoting
Third Geneva Convention, supra note 182, art. 2). Nor did the provisions of
Common Article 3 apply because the war against al Qaeda is not an “armed
conflict not of an international character,” given its global reach. See id. at 48
(quoting Third Geneva Convention, supra note 182, art. 3); see also Memorandum from George W. Bush, U.S. President, to Richard Cheney, U.S. Vice President et al., On the Humane Treatment of Taliban and al Qaeda Detainees para. 2 (Feb. 7, 2002), available at http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/
NSAEBB127/02.02.07.pdf (citing Third Geneva Convention, supra note 182,
art. 3) (setting forth the Bush Administration’s official position on the applicability of certain Geneva Convention provisions to al Qaeda or Taliban detainees).
383. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 629. Because the Court determined that the military commission was unlawful for other reasons, it “reserved” the question of
whether Hamdan was entitled to be treated as a prisoner of war under Article
5 of the Third Geneva Convention until a “competent tribunal” determined
otherwise. See id. at 629 n.61. But see Michael W. Lewis, International Myopia: Hamdan’s Shortcut to “Victory,” 42 U. RICH. L. REV. 687, 700–01 (2008)
(arguing that the Court’s interpretation of Common Article 3 “effectively foreclosed” the possibility of revisiting the applicability of Common Article 2—and
hence the full provisions of the Convention—to the war with al Qaeda).
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acter.”384 The Court characterized Common Article 3 as “afford[ing] some minimal protection, falling short of full protection under the Conventions, to individuals associated with neither a signatory nor even a nonsignatory ‘Power’ who are
involved in a conflict ‘in the territory of’ a signatory.”385
In effect, the D.C. Circuit had agreed with the Bush Administration’s argument that Hamdan fell into a gap between
Articles 2 and 3. On the one hand, Article 2—and hence the full
provisions of the Convention—was not applicable because al
Qaeda is not a state.386 On the other hand, Article 3 was not
triggered because the conflict with al Qaeda is “international in
scope.”387 Without clarifying the relevant conflict, the Court
applied Common Article 3 broadly to encompass “the armed
conflict during which Hamdan was captured.”388 The term “conflict not of an international character,” the Court held, simply
means a conflict not between states.389 The Court’s analysis
was textual: it compared the functioning of Article 3 to that of
Article 2 to establish the applicability of the former.390
Throughout its discussion the Court made liberal use of the
Commentaries to the Third and Fourth Conventions, and also
quoted the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)391 and the International Court of Justice (ICJ),
the latter through reliance on a U.S. Army JAG Law of War
Textbook.392

384. Third Geneva Convention, supra note 182, art. 3.
385. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 630.
386. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33, 41 (D.C. Cir. 2005), rev’d, 548
U.S. 557.
387. See id. at 41–42.
388. See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 628.
389. See id. at 630 (“The term ‘conflict not of an international character’ is
used here in contradistinction to a conflict between nations.”); see also Anthony Clark Arend, Who’s Afraid of the Geneva Conventions? Treaty Interpretation in the Wake of Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 22 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 709, 718–21
(2007) (discussing the Court’s use of sources to determine that Article 3 applied to the conflict in which Hamdan was captured).
390. See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 630.
391. See id. at 631 n.63 (citing Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94 -1-I, Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 102 (Int’l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995), available at http://www
.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/acdec/en/51002.htm).
392. See id. (citing BRIAN J. BILL ET AL., INT’L AND OPERATIONAL LAW
DEP’T; JUDGE ADVOCATE GEN.’S SCH., U.S. ARMY, LAW OF WAR WORKSHOP
DESKBOOK 228 n.26 (2000), available at http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/
lps34259/LOW%20Deskbook%202000.pdf ).
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The Court’s textual understanding of Common Article 3—
though supported with authorities provided by Hamdan (in the
mere three pages of his brief that addressed the provision)393
and by Professors Ryan Goodman, Derek Jinks, and AnneMarie Slaughter in an amicus brief 394—seems to have been
lifted primarily from D.C. Circuit Judge Williams’s one-page
concurrence, which itself cited no authority beyond the text for
its analysis. Judge Williams explained:
Common Article 3 fills the gap, providing some minimal protection for
such non-eligibles in an “armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties.” The gap being filled is the non-eligible party’s failure to be a nation. Thus the words “not of an international character” are sensibly
understood to refer to a conflict between a signatory nation and a
non-state actor. The most obvious form of such a conflict is a civil war.
But given the Convention’s structure, the logical reading of “international character” is one that matches the basic derivation of the word
“international,” i.e., between nations.395

Having determined that Common Article 3 applied, the
Court set about interpreting its language,396 concluding that

393. See Hamdan Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 301.
394. Brief for Professors Ryan Goodman, Derek Jinks, & Anne-Marie
Slaughter as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 18–27, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (No. 05-184) [hereinafter Hamdan Brief ].
395. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415F.3d 33, 44 (D.C. Cir. 2005), rev’d 548 U.S. 557.
396. Article 3 provides:
In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following
provisions:
(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including
members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those
placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other
cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any
adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth
or wealth, or any other similar criteria.
To this end the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at
any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the abovementioned persons:
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds,
mutilation, cruel treatment and torture;
(b) taking of hostages;
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and
degrading treatment;
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions
without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted
court affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.
(2) The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for.
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the military commission violated Article 3’s mandate that
Hamdan be tried by a “regularly constituted court.”397 For the
meaning of “regularly constituted court,” the Court relied on
the Pictet Commentary,398 the Red Cross’s study on Customary
International Humanitarian Law,399 and Justice Rutledge’s
dissent in Yamashita, which described a military commission
as a court “specially constituted for the particular trial.”400
Similarly, the Court found that the military commission
did not meet Article 3’s requirement that the tribunal afford
“all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.”401 To define this phrase the Court
looked to customary international law,402 of which it found Article 75 of Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions to be a part.403 The Court viewed Article 75 as an elaboration on Common Article 3’s “all the judicial guarantees”
provision.404 One of the guarantees listed in Article 75 is the
An impartial humanitarian body, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, may offer its services to the Parties to the
conflict.
The Parties to the conflict should further endeavour to bring into
force, by means of special agreements, all or part of the other provisions of the present Convention.
The application of the preceding provisions shall not affect the legal status of the Parties to the conflict.
Third Geneva Convention, supra note 182, art. 3.
397. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 632–33.
398. Id. at 632 (citing Pictet, CIVILIAN COMMENTARY, supra note 276, at
340, for the proposition that a regularly constituted court “definitely exclud[es]
all special tribunals”).
399. Id. (citing ICRC, CIHL, supra note 80, at 355, for the proposition that
a “regularly constituted court” is one “established and organised in accordance
with the laws and procedures already in force in a country”).
400. Id. (quoting In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 44 (1946) (Rutledge, J., dissenting)); see also Green, supra note 207, at 158–69 (describing the import of
Justice Rutledge’s dissent on Justice Stevens’s—a former Rutledge law clerk—
majority opinion).
401. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 633 (quoting Third Geneva Convention, supra
note 182, art. 3(1)(d)).
402. Id. (arguing that the phrase “must be understood to incorporate at
least the barest of those trial protections that have been recognized by customary international law”).
403. Id. at 633–34 (observing that the Commission “dispense[s] with the
principles, articulated in Article 75 and indisputably part of the customary international law, that an accused must . . . be present for his trial and must be
privy to the evidence against him”); see also Additional Protocol I, supra note
315, art. 75.
404. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 633 (quoting Third Geneva Convention, supra
note 182, art. 3(1)(d)).
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“right to be tried in [one’s] presence.”405 Acknowledging that the
United States has not ratified Additional Protocol I, the Court
observed that the United States nonetheless does not object to
it.406 Indeed, the Court cited a law review article noting the
U.S. view that the provision reflects customary international
law,407 and further stated that the United States is a party to
other instruments which contain “the same basic protections”
as those listed in Article 75.408 The Court concluded, therefore,
that although the requirements of Common Article 3 “are general ones, crafted to accommodate a wide variety of legal systems,” they are “requirements . . . nonetheless” and Hamdan’s
military commission failed to meet them.409
c. The Wrong Course to the Right Conclusion?
Criticism of Hamdan’s application and analysis of the Geneva Conventions abounds. The opinion has been described as
a departure from the Court’s usual “exceptionally thorough
analyses when international law issues are involved.”410 In contrast to its lengthy past treatment of international law issues,
the Hamdan court expends only a few pages to define the scope
of Common Article 3, determine the requirements of a “regularly constituted court,” and identify the “judicial guarantees
which are recognized as indispensible by civilized peoples.”411
Still, judged not by the Court’s approach to international law
issues generally, but by its past treatment of humanitarian
law, the amount of analysis the Court devoted to Geneva law
issues is substantial. Apart from quantity, how sound is its
analysis?

405. Id. at 633–34 (quoting Additional Protocol I, supra note 315, art.
75(4)(e)).
406. Id. at 633.
407. Id. (citing Taft, supra note 12, at 322).
408. Id. at 633 n.66 (citing International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights art. 14(3)(d), Mar. 23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 171).
409. Id. at 635.
410. Lewis, supra note 383, at 689, 694 –95 (reviewing the Court’s historical approach to international law issues, particularly treaty interpretation,
and concluding that it “traditionally displays a very broad and deep consideration of sources when interpreting both customary and international law and
international treaties”). But cf. Arend, supra note 389, at 722–29 (arguing that
Hamdan’s approach is congruent with the Court’s prior approach to treaty interpretation).
411. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 625–35; see also Lewis, supra note 383, at 705–
06 (noting the comparatively cursory treatment of Geneva law issues).
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On one end of the spectrum, some criticize the substantive
finding that Article 3 applies to what may most accurately be
termed a transnational armed conflict.412 The Court’s holding
stands in marked contrast to the traditional view that Common
Article 3 applies only to intrastate wars.413 Indeed, states’ historical reluctance to admit of Article 3’s application because of
the corresponding impingement on sovereignty highlights the
significance of this holding.414 By finding, in effect, that Article
3 applies regardless of how one characterizes the underlying
conflict, the Court eschews the traditional international/noninternational bifurcation.
On the other end of the spectrum, others accept the substantive result that Article 3 applies to the armed conflict with
412. See, e.g., Ingrid Detter, The Law of War and Illegal Combatants, 75
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1049, 1080–85 (2007); Julian Ku & John Yoo, Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld, The Functional Case for Foreign Affairs Deference to the Executive
Branch, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 179, 190–91 (2006) (“Thinking on the law of
war at [the time of the drafting] simply had not developed to the point where it
could consider the status of conflicts fought by non-state actors such as al
Qaeda.”). A former State Department Legal Advisor has expressed similar
skepticism. See John Bellinger, Contemporary Practice of the United States
Relating to International Law: State Department Legal Advisor Finds Gaps in
Legal Regime for Detention of Transnational Terrorists, 102 AM. J. INT’L L.
367, 368 (2008) (“While the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld held that the conflict with al Qaida . . . is a non-international conflict covered by Common Article 3, I think many international legal scholars would
question that conclusion.” (alteration in original)). One may argue that this
criticism is premature, however, given the Court’s failure clearly to identify
the relevant conflict, as described below.
413. The authoritative Commentaries, for example, are filled with references to Article 3 as being applicable to “civil wars,” “insurrection[s],” or conflicts “of an internal character” involving “insurgents” or “rebels.” See INT’L
COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY, II GENEVA CONVENTION FOR THE
AMELIORATION OF THE CONDITION OF WOUNDED, SICK AND SHIPWRECKED
MEMBERS OF ARMED FORCES AT SEA 33–39 (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1960); Pictet,
CIVILIAN COMMENTARY, supra note 276, at 26–34; Pictet, FIELD
COMMENTARY, supra note 381, at 38–61; Pictet, POW COMMENTARY, supra
note 57, at 28–44; see also Sean D. Murphy, Evolving Geneva Convention Paradigms in the “War on Terrorism”: Applying the Core Rules to the Release of
Persons Deemed “Unprivileged Combatants,” 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1105,
1115 (2007); Rona, supra note 19, at 58–59. While the Commentaries hardly
settle the matter—as Justice Stevens points out, they also state that “the
scope of application of the Article must be as wide as possible,” Hamdan, 548
U.S. at 631 (quoting Pictet, POW COMMENTARY, supra note 57, at 36)—they
strongly suggest that the drafters did not contemplate the application of Article 3 to conflicts like the one at issue in Hamdan. But see Jinks, supra note
274, at 12 (arguing that Common Article 3 is applicable to the conflict between
the United States and al Qaeda).
414. Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, Hamdan and Common Article 3: Did the Supreme Court Get It Right?, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1523, 1543–45 (2007).
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al Qaeda, but criticize the Court’s failure to grapple explicitly
with the nuances of humanitarian law.415 Principal among the
opinion’s shortcomings in this respect is its failure to identify
the relevant conflict. While most commentators and, significantly, the Bush Administration, have read the opinion to identify an armed conflict between the United States and al Qaeda,416 the opinion by its terms does not specify that Article 3
applies to the broader war against al Qaeda or the “war on terrorism” generally. Indeed, the opinion leaves unclear precisely
the group of persons to whom Article 3 applies.417 On its face,
Hamdan forecloses neither the possibility that other Geneva
law provisions apply to Hamdan nor the possibility that Article
3 is inapplicable to those detained outside of Afghanistan.418
This resolution was understandably attractive to the Court: it
allowed the majority at once to rebuff the Bush Administration’s view that certain individuals are outside the scope of IHL

415. See, e.g., Lewis, supra note 383, at 706–15 (arguing that a “more complete reading of the Geneva Conventions as a whole and their accompanying
Commentaries” reveals a principle of individual accountability—“the protections of Common Article 3 are earned”—that sits in tension with the principle
of universal applicability highlighted by the Court); Ní Aoláin, supra note 414,
at 1529 (noting the absence of any treatment in the plurality opinion of the
drafting history of Article 3); id. at 1547–48 (suggesting that a consideration of
Common Article 3’s potential status as customary international law would
have bolstered the Court’s conclusions as to the substantive rights at issue).
For a discussion as to whether Common Article 3 has assumed customary law
status, see THEODOR MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN NORMS AS
CUSTOMARY LAW 33–62 (1989).
416. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DIR. NO. 2310.01E ¶¶ 2.2, 4.2 (Sept. 5, 2006),
available at http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/Detainee_Prgm_Dir_2310_9
-5-06.pdf (stating that in “all armed conflicts, however such conflicts are characterized, and in all other military operations,” U.S. forces “shall apply, without regard to a detainee’s legal status, at a minimum the standards articulated in Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949”); see also
Bellinger, supra note 412, at 368 (“Hamdan v. Rumsfeld held that the conflict
with al Qaida . . . is a non-international conflict covered by Common Article 3
. . . .” (emphasis in original)).
417. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 629 (2006), superseded by statute,
Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600; see also Ní Aoláin, supra note 414, at 1551–52. Justice Kennedy, however, refers
more specifically to “our Nation’s armed conflict with al Qaeda in Afghanistan”
and “our Nation’s armed conflict with the Taliban and al Qaeda.” Hamdan,
548 U.S. at 642–43, 646 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part); see also Eran Shamir-Borer, Revisiting Hamdan v. Rumsfeld’s Analysis of the Laws of Armed
Conflict, 21 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 601, 608 n.40 (2007).
418. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 628–30; see also Murphy, supra note 413, at
1139 & n.139. But see Lewis, supra note 383, at 701 (stating that the Court’s
opinion effectively forecloses revisiting the applicability of Article 2).
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and to skirt thorny political and legal questions about the extent and nature of the underlying conflict.
Yet the price of this desirable result—that IHL provides
baseline protections in all conflicts—is the clarity of the Court’s
analysis. Above all, Hamdan’s treatment of humanitarian law
seems to be result driven.419 As in Hamdi, the Court sacrificed
precision by importing provisions of humanitarian law without
clearly explaining why such provisions are applicable. The Article 3 holding can usefully be understood as an attempt to seek
a politically palatable middle ground. While clearly a repudiation of the government’s position, the opinion’s studious avoidance of a more rigorous IHL analysis may have sidestepped an
even bigger defeat for the Bush Administration, namely, a reprise of the district court’s conclusion that Article 2 “covers the
hostilities in Afghanistan” and hence that Hamdan was entitled to prisoner-of-war status.420 By intimating, without clearly deciding, that the global war with al Qaeda is noninternational, the Court may have effectively foreclosed future
claims by suspected terrorists to prisoner of war status, a category that does not exist in non-international armed conflicts.421
Questions about the ultimate policy implications of the
Court’s reasoning notwithstanding,422 the substance of the
Court’s Article 3 holding represents an unmistakable contribution to the international jurisprudence of humanitarian law.
Since the 1949 Conventions, humanitarian law has increasingly moved toward the regulation of armed conflicts between
states and non-state actors.423 In Hamdan, the Court goes
419. Kenneth Anderson, The Rise of International Criminal Law: Intended
and Unintended Consequences, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 331, 352 (2009) (characterizing the Court’s reasoning: “[W]e need a baseline humanitarian standard applied
to these detainees; [Common Article 3] provides such a standard; we can get
[Common Article 3] by finding a possibly global armed conflict with Al Qaeda.”).
420. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F. Supp. 2d 152, 160, 165 (D.D.C. 2004)
(“[Hamdan is] entitled to the protections of the Third Geneva Convention as a
prisoner of war . . . unless and until the ‘competent tribunal’ referred to in Article 5 concludes otherwise.”), rev’d, 415 F.3d 33 (D.C. Cir. 2005), rev’d, 548
U.S. 557 (2006).
421. See Ryan Goodman, The Detention of Civilians in Armed Conflict, 103
AM. J. INT’L L. 48, 49 (2009) (arguing for no status-based categories in noninternational armed conflicts); Cerone, supra note 43, at 404 (same).
422. See, e.g., Gruber, supra note 377, at 1064 (“Hamdan allowed Congress
to rubber stamp procedures in violation of the Geneva Conventions, while retaining the pretense of respect for Geneva’s principles.”).
423. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 325, at 2069 & n.92. The 1977 Protocols, for example, regulate a number of such conflicts. E.g., Additional Protocol I, supra note 315, art. 1(4).
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beyond other bodies in making an important contribution to
this trend. In addition to the Commentaries, the Court supported its broad reading of Article 3 with references to the similarly expansive interpretations by the ICTY and ICJ.424 Yet as
even petitioner’s brief suggests, these bodies relied on Common
Article 3 as a manifestation of customary international law, not
treaty law.425 The ICJ, for example, in describing Article 3 as a
“minimum yardstick” applicable to all conflicts, plainly framed
this understanding as a matter of customary international
law.426 The ICTY, in turn, relied heavily on this judgment in
noting that “the character of the conflict is irrelevant” for Article 3 purposes.427 The Hamdan majority, by contrast, did not
even broach the question of Article 3’s status as customary international law.428 Because the Court applies Article 3 as a
matter of treaty law—through the notion of its incorporation by
statute—it goes beyond the international sources on which it
relies.429 The implication of the Court’s decision is difficult to
overstate. Whether one views Hamdan as a positive step toward international law’s increasing regulation of non-state actors or a dangerous encroachment into political branch preroga-

424. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 631 n.63.
425. See Hamdan Brief, supra note 394, at 49.
426. Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar.
v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 113–14 (June 27) (judging the United States “according to the fundamental general principles of humanitarian law . . . [of which]
the Geneva Conventions are in some respects a development, and in other respects no more than the expression, of such principles” and hence declining to
consider the role of the U.S. reservation to the Convention); see also id. at 537
(Jennings, J., dissenting) (“[T]here must be at least very serious doubts
whether [the Geneva Conventions] could be regarded as embodying customary
law. Even the Court’s view that the common Article 3, laying down a ‘minimum yardstick’ for armed conflicts of a non-international character, are applicable as ‘elementary considerations of humanity’, is not a matter free from difficulty.” (citation omitted)).
427. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94 -1-I, Decision on Defence Motion
for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 102 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995), available at http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/
acdec/en/51002.htm (“In an important subsequent development, States specified certain minimum mandatory rules applicable to internal armed conflicts
in common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949. The International
Court of Justice has confirmed that these rules reflect ‘elementary considerations of humanity’ applicable under customary international law to any armed
conflict, whether it is of an internal or international character. Therefore, at
least with respect to the minimum rules in common Article 3, the character of
the conflict is irrelevant.” (citation omitted)).
428. Ní Aoláin, supra note 414, at 1547–48.
429. Shamir-Borer, supra note 417, at 612.
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tives, the decision is a clear contribution to the international
jurisprudence of humanitarian law.430
3. Boumediene and Munaf
Issued on the same day, the opinions in Boumediene v.
Bush and Munaf v. Geren made peripheral mention to humanitarian law in ways not dispositive to the holdings in either case.
Writing for a unanimous Court in Munaf, Chief Justice Roberts
made a single reference to “the Geneva Convention.”431 In holding that the writ of habeas corpus provided no relief to U.S. citizens who voluntarily traveled to Iraq and allegedly committed
crimes there,432 Justice Roberts noted that “[i]n accordance
with Article 5 of the Geneva Convention, [petitioner] was permitted to hear the basis for his detention, make a statement,
and call immediately available witnesses.”433
In Boumediene, while not mentioned in the majority opinion, Geneva law appeared on the periphery in Justice Roberts’s
dissent. The Boumediene majority held that alien detainees at
Guantánamo could invoke the Suspension Clause, allowing
them to file habeas petitions, and that section 7 of the Military
Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA)434 violated that provision by
supplanting federal habeas jurisdiction with a constitutionally
insufficient substitute.435 As to the detainee’s access to the
Suspension Clause, the Court engaged in a historical analy430. It is not clear, however, that the development is a positive one for either the integrity of IHL or the practical administration of justice. See Anderson, supra note 419, at 352 (“The attempt by US courts to reach conclusions
which satisfy many different practical realities of US counter-terrorism, but
doing so by an excursion through the Geneva Conventions, might yield good
behavioural rules and results, but at risk of deforming the law of war as it applies to ‘ordinary’ armed conflicts.”); Ní Aoláin, supra note 414, at 1551 (arguing that the Court’s failure to address the nature of the underlying conflict
may, “in the longer term, create more problems for administration of justice in
the context of the U.S.-led ‘war on terror’ than it solves”).
431. Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 681 (2008).
432. Id. at 680.
433. Id. at 681. This process was afforded during petitioner’s designation
as a “security internee” and “enemy combatant in the war on terrorism” by
military tribunal. Id. at 682.
434. Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600. Section 7 expressly applied the
DTA’s jurisdiction-stripping provision to both future and pending habeas petitions. In effect, this provision meant that detainees whose petitions were pending at the time of the DTA could not invoke the federal habeas statute.
435. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 793–95 (2008). The substitute was
the system of judicial review by Combatant Status Review Tribunal (CSRT)
and possible appellate review by the D.C. Circuit, as established by the DTA. Id.
at 783–92.
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sis—ultimately inconclusive—as to the extraterritorial application of that Clause.436 The Court held that neither the status
nor the location of petitioners could deny them the protections
of the writ.437 As to whether section 7 of the MCA constituted a
suspension of the writ, the Court found that the Detainee
Treatment Act of 2005 (DTA) / Combatant Status Review Tribunal system of review unquestionably limited detainees’
process without providing an adequate substitute.438 Neither of
these holdings relied on humanitarian law. Indeed, the Court
emphasized that “our opinion does not address the content of
the law that governs petitioners’ detention.”439 Nonetheless,
humanitarian law questions were indeed before the Court. Petitioners argued that humanitarian law limited the government’s detention authority to members of the armed forces and
citizens who participate directly in hostilities.440 The Court did
not address this question, and thus left unresolved the scope of
detention authority under IHL.
While IHL was not center stage, it played a background
role in the Court’s adjudication of the case. Justice Roberts in
dissent referred to the Geneva Conventions to bolster his argument that the DTA system of review was “adequate to vindicate whatever due process rights petitioners may have.”441 In
making the point that DTA procedures restricting detainee
access to classified material were more than constitutionally
adequate, Justice Roberts pointed out that prisoners challenging their status under the Geneva Conventions are not entitled
to such access, and that “the prisoner-of-war model is the one
Hamdi cited as consistent with the demands of due process for
436. Id. at 739–52.
437. Id. at 753–55, 765–71.
438. Id. at 770–92. For a brief summary of the process afforded to detainees in the CSRT system, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel Meltzer, Habeas
Corpus Jurisdiction, Substantive Rights, and the War on Terror, 120 HARV. L.
REV. 2029, 2100 n.286 (2007).
439. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 798.
440. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 26–27, Boumediene v. Bush, 553
U.S. 723 (2008) (No. 06-1195).
441. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 808, 816–17 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). Chief
Justice Roberts also observed that the DTA system of review met the majority’s standard of “a meaningful opportunity to demonstrate that [they are] being
held pursuant to the erroneous application or interpretation of relevant law.”
Id. at 815 (alteration in original) (quoting id. at 779 (majority opinion)). Chief
Justice Roberts would not have framed the question in terms of whether the
DTA procedure was an adequate “substitute” for habeas; rather, the relevant
inquiry in his view was: (1) What constitutional rights do aliens captured abroad
have, and (2) do the DTA procedures adequately protect them? Id. at 801–03.
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citizens.”442 If it is good enough for citizens, Justice Roberts
reasoned, surely it is good enough for the alien petitioners.
Similarly, encouraging the reader to “[s]tep back and consider
what, in the real world, Congress and the Executive have actually granted aliens captured by our Armed Forces overseas
and found to be enemy combatants,” Justice Roberts listed
“[t]he ability to challenge the bases of their detention before
military tribunals modeled after Geneva Convention procedures.”443
Justice Roberts’s references to Geneva law in Munaf and
Boumediene offered no substantive analysis of the Geneva Conventions. In Munaf, he merely acknowledged that petitioners
had been afforded the opportunity to challenge the basis for
their detention, congruent with the Conventions, a point made
repeatedly by the government in its filings before the Court.444
In Boumediene, Justice Roberts used Geneva law to rhetorical
effect and as an aid in constitutional interpretation. In essence,
the Chief Justice suggested that the DTA procedure’s similarities to Geneva Convention procedures militated in favor of their
constitutional adequacy.
The foregoing sections demonstrate that even when explicitly relying on IHL provisions, the Court has been deeply reluctant to address any more of that body of law than necessary. A
recent dissent from the Court’s denial of certiorari written by
Justice Thomas stands in marked contrast to that trend. While
it is far from clear that the dissent portends a change in the
Court’s general approach to humanitarian law, it does suggest
that at least two members of the Court are willing—indeed eager—to address several issues surrounding the Geneva Conventions.
4. An Emerging Change of Heart on Geneva Issues?
The Court’s 2010 refusal to hear an appeal stemming from
a habeas petition brought by Manuel Noriega, former head of
the Panamanian Defense Forces, occasioned a vigorous dissent
442. Id. at 817 (citing Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 538 (2004)). Roberts read Hamdi to be “of pressing relevance” as establishing the procedures
required for American citizens detained as enemy combatants. Id. at 812. If
the DTA system “looks a lot like the procedure Hamdi blessed [for citizens],”
id., then “surely the Due Process Clause does not afford non-citizens . . . greater protection than citizens are due.” Id. at 804.
443. Id. at 825.
444. E.g., Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 14 n.4, Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S.
674 (2008) (No. 07-394).
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from Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia.445 While the
denial of certiorari may itself be unremarkable,446 the strongly
worded dissent is doubly surprising against the backdrop of the
Court’s historical reluctance to engage the Geneva Conventions. Justice Thomas, in short, appeared eager to adjudicate
Noriega’s Geneva law claims.
After his conviction in federal court of various narcoticsrelated offenses, Noriega argued that the United States should
treat him as a prisoner of war, and thus afford him all the protections of the Geneva Conventions. The district court agreed.
After years in custody as a prisoner of war and shortly before
his parole and expected extradition to France to face criminal
charges, Noriega argued that the Third Geneva Convention
barred his extradition. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit agreed
with the government’s view that section 5 of the MCA barred
Noriega from invoking the Geneva Convention in his habeas
proceeding.447 In declining to hear Noriega’s case, therefore, the
Court decided not to entertain his claim that section 5 violated
the Supremacy and Suspension Clauses of the U.S. Constitution by working a “complete repudiation” of the Third Geneva
Convention and an “effective[]” suspension of the writ of habeas corpus under Boumediene, respectively.448
While Justice Thomas put forth several reasons why the
Court should have engaged Noriega’s MCA arguments, he
seemed concerned principally with “provid[ing] courts and the
political branches with much needed guidance on issues we left
open in Boumediene,” issues with which the lower courts have
been grappling with since that decision.449 In highlighting the
445. Noriega v. Pastrana, 130 S. Ct. 1002 (2010) (Thomas, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari).
446. Kevin H. Smith, Certiorari and the Supreme Court Agenda: An Empirical Analysis, 54 OKLA. L. REV. 727, 729 (2001) (noting that the Court accepts
certiorari in less than three of every one hundred cases).
447. Noriega, 130 S. Ct. 1004 (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari).
448. Id. at 1005.
449. Id. at 1006, 1009 (“A decision upholding MCA § 5(a) would obviate the
need for detainees, the Government and federal courts to struggle (as they did
here) with Geneva Convention claims in habeas corpus proceedings.”). For critiques of the district court and D.C. Circuit jurisprudence to which Justice
Thomas refers, see HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST & THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT,
HABEAS WORKS: FEDERAL COURTS’ PROVEN CAPACITY TO HANDLE
GUANTÁNAMO CASES (2010), available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp
-content/uploads/pdf/Habeas-Works-final-web.pdf; BENJAMIN WITTES ET AL.,
BROOKING INST., THE EMERGING LAW OF DETENTION: THE GUANTÁNAMO
HABEAS CASES AS LAWMAKING (2010) available at http://www.brookings.edu/
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need for such guidance, Justice Thomas pointed to recent executive branch pronouncements about the broad applicability of
Common Article 3 and contemplated legislation clarifying the
extent to which detainees can enforce Geneva Convention obligations against the United States. Noting that these proposals
have been “complicated by uncertainty over [questions] in this
case,” Justice Thomas saw Noriega’s petition as an opportunity
to address these issues in order to “avoid years of litigation and
uncertainty.”450
Justice Thomas further speculated that ruling on the constitutionality of section 5 of the MCA “could well allow [the
Court] to reach the question we left open in Hamdan—whether
the Geneva Conventions are self-executing and judicially enforceable.”451 Noriega’s case would have enabled the Court to approach the Geneva Conventions differently than in previous
cases because it was not governed by the UCMJ provisions implicated in Hamdan. Indeed, if the Court were to conclude that
the conventions are self-executing and judicially enforceable, it
would face two additional questions: “whether federal courts
may classify [noncitizen] detainees as POWs under the Third
[Geneva] Convention, and whether any of the conventions require the United States immediately to repatriate detainees”
released from custody.452
The dissent is remarkable not for its analysis of the Geneva Conventions—although this is more than Justice Thomas
has ever observed about the Conventions in a majority or dissenting opinion—but rather for its willingness, indeed eagerness, to reach Noriega’s Geneva claims. Justice Thomas seemed
to favor providing what would amount, in effect, to an advisory
opinion on the judicial enforceability of the conventions for the
benefit of the political branches and the lower courts. This willingness to engage Geneva law—seemingly engendered by lower court and political branch difficulties in operationalizing
Boumediene and Hamdi—is truly a novel development.

papers/2010/0122_guantanamo_wittes_chesney.aspx; Nathaniel H. Nesbitt,
Note, Meeting Boumediene’s Challenge: The Emergence of an Effective Habeas
Jurisprudence and Obsolescence of New Detention Legislation, 95 MINN. L.
REV. 244 (2010).
450. Noriega, 130 S. Ct. at 1008–09 (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari).
451. Id. at 1009.
452. Id.
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CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has invoked humanitarian law—
whether customary or treaty-based—from its earliest days,
though only in a relatively small number of cases. The Court’s
references to customary humanitarian law predate the Lieber
Code, but, perhaps unsurprisingly, become more numerous during and after the Civil War. Further, the Court recognizes
foundational humanitarian law principles, including the principle of distinction, well before codification of humanitarian law
at the Hague and in Geneva. These features suggest that the
Court has some role to play in interpreting and developing humanitarian law.
Broadly speaking, the Court has invoked humanitarian
law (1) to address claims allegedly arising under the Hague and
Geneva Conventions, (2) as a tool of constitutional interpretation, and (3) as a tool of statutory construction, or, stated differently, for reasons of definition—both to define particular concepts and to concretize charges levied against an accused
allegedly subject to trial by military tribunal. As to addressing
claims arguably arising under IHL, the Court has been very reluctant to find a violation of the Conventions or to recognize
rights allegedly conferred on individuals thereby. As to the
Hague Conventions, this reluctance does not push the bounds
of judicial restraint: the Court’s approach is justifiable on the
facts of each case. Yet as to the Geneva Conventions, the treaty-based component of IHL to receive the Court’s most sustained attention, the question is a closer one. The Court engaged in elaborate textual gymnastics in Yamashita to render
the 1929 Convention inapplicable, but reversed course in Hamdan to reach the novel conclusion that Common Article 3 of the
1949 Conventions applies as a matter of treaty law (albeit one
incorporated via statute) to an arguably transnational armed
conflict. A cynic thus might suggest that the Court’s willingness
to find a violation of the Conventions may change with the political winds.
Recourse to humanitarian law treaties to interpret the
Constitution is infrequent. The Court has drawn on the conventions only once in a majority opinion to interpret the Eighth
Amendment bar on cruel and unusual punishment. In the
armed conflict context, Hamdi opened the door to the suggestion that detention procedures compliant with the conventions
also satisfy the Constitution’s due process requirements, a
point since raised as a sword in dissent by Justice Roberts.
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The Court’s use of humanitarian law as a tool of statutory
construction is further evidence of its reluctance to rely directly
on the Conventions. In this regard, the Court’s early holdings
that the 1929 Convention did not reach petitioners in Yamashita and Eisentrager—findings rooted in the Court’s Hague-lawbased decision in Quirin—set the parameters of the Court’s
humanitarian law analyses in the detainee cases of the “war on
terror.” In each case, the Court takes care to point out that its
reliance on humanitarian law is necessitated by the law of
war’s incorporation into domestic law by statute. The Court is
thus able consistently to evade the issue of whether the Conventions are self-executing. In the process of consulting humanitarian law to define the charges against petitioners, the Court
offers informative if controversial analysis of particular provisions of the Hague and Geneva Conventions, including rooting
the principle of command responsibility in humanitarian law.
The Court’s IHL analysis is sometimes haphazard—
emphasizing certain concepts while ignoring others—and never
comprehensive. In short, the Court often leaves humanitarian
law issues unresolved, even questions essential to the resolution of issues that it does address. In the post-September 11,
2001, detainee cases, for example, the Court’s analysis suffers
from its steadfast refusal clearly to identify the underlying conflict. The Court’s single most significant contribution to humanitarian law jurisprudence is undoubtedly its holding that Article 3 applies to the war with al Qaeda.453 Notwithstanding the
host of potent criticisms to be levied against the Court’s analysis, the substance of this holding advances a core principle of
IHL: that all persons are entitled to some baseline of protection.
One reason that the Court’s treatment of IHL is significant
is the widely accepted proposition that the United States plays
a major role in the development of customary international
humanitarian law.454 The Court’s interpretation of Hague and
Geneva law may thus contribute to the establishment of opinio
juris or, indirectly, U.S. practice. This review of the Court’s
humanitarian law jurisprudence suggests, however, that the
Court is profoundly reluctant to root its holdings in humanitarian law treaties. Indeed, it is the incorporation of the law of war
453. As discussed in supra notes 412–18 and accompanying text, the opinion does not compel this result. Nonetheless, this reading has been adopted by
the government and most commentators.
454. See, e.g., Skordas, supra note 15, at 319.
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into domestic statute that occasions the Court’s most extensive
analysis of IHL. On the facts before it, the Court has explicitly
found only one violation of humanitarian law, which it likewise
found to be compelled by statute. These features urge caution
in attempting to establish opinio juris as to U.S. compliance
with humanitarian law by reference to the Court’s jurisprudence.
In sum, the Supreme Court may not be institutionally wellsuited to interpret and develop humanitarian law. Notwithstanding Justice Thomas’s recent display to the contrary, the
Court is deeply reluctant to rely on humanitarian law treaties
and does so rarely, haphazardly, and minimally, eschewing
comprehensive analysis of the text, structure, and history of
the relevant provisions. Moreover, from Yamashita to Hamdan,
the Court’s use of humanitarian law often seems result-driven,
calculated to achieve a politically palatable outcome. Indeed,
this feature may partially explain the lack of clarity in the
Court’s IHL analysis. It is tempting to identify these tendencies
as unsurprising features of a common-law court historically
suspicious of international legal authority, and conclude accordingly that the Court has only a minimal role to play in the
development of IHL.455 Yet this conclusion would be premature.
The Court’s role in the development of humanitarian law is not
insubstantial. Even when declining formally to address a claim
allegedly arising under the Geneva or Hague Conventions, for
example, the Court sometimes offers explicit analysis in the
form of application of the relevant treaty provisions to the facts
before the Court, thus producing authoritative and precedential
interpretations of IHL. Throughout this process the Court has
unearthed various substantive provisions of humanitarian law
and offered a novel interpretation of at least one of them. While
the Supreme Court’s role in developing IHL will continue to be
limited by its reluctance directly to engage the body of law, the
Court’s preeminence in a state crucial to shaping the international legal order ensures that it has an important role to play.

455. The Court’s role in developing the law should be sharply distinguished
from how it perceives the judicial task. As one recent characterization of the
Court’s postwar treaty jurisprudence put it: “The Court that emerges is one
that decides cases, not one that sees its primary function as our instruction
and illumination.” Stephan, supra note 11, at 8.

